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DANCING WITH THE DERIVATIVES DEVIL:
MUTUAL FUNDS’ DANGEROUS LIAISON WITH
COMPLEX INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
AND THE FORGOTTEN LESSONS OF 1940
Kelly S. Kibbie*

This Article examines the implications of the drastic increase in the use of
complex derivative instruments by mutual funds in recent years and the
inadequacies of the current statutory and regulatory framework to effectively
protect investors. Astonishingly, there is no reliable information regarding the
nature and extent of derivatives use by mutual funds. A series of derivatives
disasters demonstrating the catastrophic possibilities of these complex
contracts, juxtaposed with the clearly annunciated purposes of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) to protect investors from the dangers of
leverage, emphasize the need for prompt reform. With $11.6 trillion in the
mutual fund purse, and with 94% of individual mutual fund investors saving for
retirement, this situation is particularly timely.
The Article asserts that the doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act are being
undermined by mutual funds’ pervasive use of derivatives. Enacted to regulate
investment companies following abuses during the Great Depression, the 1940
Act arguably prohibits many types of derivative transactions by mutual funds.
Further complicating matters, the SEC has not engaged in any rulemaking with
respect to derivatives transactions by mutual funds and has not provided any
formal guidance regarding the same since 1979, years before swaps were even
invented. Reforms should be enacted to prevent the types of harms to investors
and the financial markets that the 1940 Act was designed to prevent, while
preserving the unique benefits that derivatives trading can offer.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the implications of the drastic increase in
the use of complex derivative instruments 1 by mutual funds 2 in recent
years and the inadequacies of the current statutory and regulatory
framework to effectively protect investors. In its recent Concept
Release on the use of derivatives by investment companies, 3 the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) noted the “dramatic
growth in the volume and complexity of derivatives investments over
the past two decades,” but stated that “complete data concerning the
nature of derivatives activities of funds is unavailable . . . .” 4 The U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) echoed this alarm,
stating that “trading by . . . [registered investment companies] in
derivatives including swaps has exploded to proportions far beyond
anything contemplated by the SEC’s governing statutes.” 5 Currently,
there “is no source of reliable information regarding the general use of
derivatives by registered investment companies,” 6 as much derivatives
1. Derivatives are broadly defined as financial instruments whose value is derived from
other variables (referred to as “reference assets” or “underliers”). See, e.g., Use of Derivatives by
Investment Companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n
Concept Release (Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter the SEC Concept Release] at 4–5, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-175.htm; JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER
DERIVATIVES 1 (8th ed. 2012); Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century
Understanding, 43 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1 (2011). Often, such variables are the prices of specified
traded assets; for example, stock options are derivatives based on the value of the specified
underlying stocks. See, e.g., HULL, supra, at 1. However, derivatives can be built on “almost any
variable, from the price of hogs to the amount of snow falling at a certain ski resort.” Id.; see also
infra text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
2. Although the scope of this Article is limited to the use of derivatives by mutual funds,
there is obvious applicability to other types of investment companies as well. In the United States,
there are four main types of investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (“1940”): open-end investment companies (mutual funds), closed-end investment
companies, unit investment trusts (“UITs”), and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”). See, e.g.,
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 198 (52d ed. 2012); cf. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-4 (2006) (dividing investment companies into “three principal classes:” face-amount
certificate companies, unit investment trusts, and management companies).
3. The stated purpose of the SEC Concept Release was to seek public comment regarding
whether “regulatory initiatives or guidance are needed to improve the current regulatory regime
and the specific nature of any such initiatives.” SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id. at 5 n.7 and accompanying text.
5. Defendant Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Motion to Dismiss in Part
at 2, Inv. Co. Inst. v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv-00612 (D.D.C., June 18,
2012) [hereinafter CFTC Summary Judgment Motion].
6. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 42 (emphasis added) (citing
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisers: Compliance Obligations, 77 Fed.
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trading information has historically not been required to be reported
to any regulator. 7 As set forth herein, the fragments of information
that are available regarding derivative use by investment companies
highlight the need for attention to this issue. 8
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”), 9 enacted to
regulate investment companies following abuses endemic during the
Great Depression, 10 is inadequate to deal with the complex derivative
instruments utilized today. 11 Arguably, a plain reading of the 1940 Act
prohibits many types of derivative transactions by mutual funds. 12
Furthermore, the SEC has not engaged in any rulemaking with respect
to derivatives transactions by mutual funds and has not provided any
formal guidance regarding the same since 1979, years before swaps 13
were even invented. 14
Without doubt, the agency charged with overseeing most
derivatives activity, the CFTC, is working diligently to implement
reforms effectuating the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Reg. 11,252, 11,275 (Feb. 24, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 4, 145, 147) [hereinafter Final
CPO Rules], as corrected due to publication errors in 77 Fed. Reg. 17,238 (Mar. 26, 2012)).
7. Id. at 15 (emphasis added) (citing Final CPO Rules at 11,253). The Final CPO Rules would
require a significant amount of such information to be reported to the CFTC, if such regulations
are able to withstand current judicial attack. See discussion infra Part III(B).
8. See infra Part III.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
10. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 29 (3rd
ed. 2011); see also infra Part IV.
11. As the Chairman of the SEC recently explained, “when the Investment Company Act [of
1940] was adopted, derivatives as we now know them did not exist.” Mary Schapiro, Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Opening Remarks at SEC Open Meeting (Washington, D.C.,
Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch083111mls-item1.htm.
“The [1940] Act imposes important leverage, valuation, diversification, and industry
concentration requirements to help protect fund investors. However, those limitations were
written with stocks and bonds in mind, not complex financial derivatives.” Id. (emphasis added).
12. See infra Part V(B).
13. Swaps, first developed in the 1980s, are merely OTC agreements in which the parties
thereto agree to exchange cash flows at a future date. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 148; SEC
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 11–12 n.25. Such cash flows may involve varying interest rates,
exchange rates or other market variable considerations. See, e.g., id.; see infra note 67. Swap
agreements may assume many forms, with exotic swap instruments increasing in number in
recent years. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 175. The Dodd-Frank Act enacted statutory
definitions of the terms “swap” and “security-based swap,” along with other related terms, which
have been further clarified by the CFTC and SEC. See discussion infra Part II(B).
14. The subsequent releases and informal opinions from the SEC Staff offer only piecemeal
(and sometimes contradictory) guidance. See discussion infra Part V(B). As noted by a task force
of the ABA Section of Business Law studying the issue, “the use of derivatives by funds has evolved
beyond the scope of the limited regulatory guidance that exists.” Report of the Task Force on
Investment Company Use of Derivatives and Leverage, COMM. ON FED. REG. OF SEC., A.B.A, SEC. OF BUS.
LAW, 5 (2010),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/ibl/2010/08/0002.pdf
(emphasis added) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report].
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Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 15 reversing the long
period of deregulation following the enactment of the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) 16 in 2000. However, certain
aspects of the CFTC’s key efforts aimed at providing transparency to
this “previously opaque area of investment activity” 17 are being
challenged by the mutual fund industry. 18
In light of the recent global financial crisis ignited by credit default
swaps, 19 which caught the entire financial world by surprise, and the
industry’s resistance to certain reform endeavors, 20 scholarly sunshine
into the dark area of derivatives use by mutual funds is both timely and
important. This is especially true given that 44% of households in the
United States own shares of registered investment companies, 21
expecting them to be relatively safe, well-regulated investments; in
fact, an overwhelming 94% of individual mutual fund investors
indicate that the reason they invest in mutual funds is to save for
retirement. 22 However, there is a strong concern that most investors
understand neither the use of derivatives by mutual funds nor the risks
With $13 trillion in the U.S. registered
inherent therewith. 23
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 12 & 15 of the U.S. Code). Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act, captioned “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010,” sets forth
the provisions applicable to derivatives reform.
16. Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). The
CFMA “was the culmination of the deregulation of the 1990s and set the stage for an explosion in
derivatives trading.” Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the
Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First Century Financial Markets, NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
Vol. 107) (manuscript at 6), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2010606 (noting that after the enactment of the CFMA, “from 2000 to 2008, trade in over-thecounter derivatives increased from $95.2 trillion to $592 trillion—522 percent” and that “[t]he
growth in credit default swaps . . . alone was even more extreme . . . .”). Thus, importantly, “what
seems like an age-old commitment to deregulated financial markets is in fact an ‘invented
tradition’ that goes back only 15–20 years. With the benefit of hindsight, the deregulation of
financial markets that began in the 1990s was a serious mistake.” Id. at 54.
17. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 42 (citing Final CPO Rules at 11,281).
18. See infra Part III(B).
19. See infra notes 53–55.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 83 and 121–24.
21. See, e.g., 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 86. Of these households,
approximately 25 percent had household incomes of less than $50,000. Id. at 88. Sixty-two
percent of households owning mutual funds had household incomes of less than $100,000. Id.
Approximately 90 million individuals owned mutual fund shares in 2011, representing 89% of
total mutual fund assets. Id at 86.
22. 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 87.
23. See Andrew J. Donahue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Investment Company Act of 1940: Regulatory Gap between Paradigm and Reality? (Apr. 17,
2009), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch041709ajd.htm [hereinafter the 2009
Donohue Speech]. See, e.g., SEC Seeks Public Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and
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investment company purse as of the end of 2011, 24 the issue is a critical
one that deserves attention.
The doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act are currently being
undermined by mutual funds’ pervasive use of complex derivative
instruments. The current statutory and regulatory framework is
inadequate to deal with this complicated issue. Reforms should be
made to prevent the types of harms to investors and the financial
markets that the 1940 Act was designed to prevent, while preserving
the unique benefits that derivatives trading can offer. This Article is
intended to assist legislators, investment companies, investors and
scholars in understanding and analyzing this complex area of the law.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the derivatives
market, including descriptions of commonly used derivative
instruments and a summary of the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act with
respect to derivative reforms. Part III examines the dramatic rise in
the use of derivatives by mutual funds and the opposition of the
industry to certain reform efforts. Part IV examines the history of
widespread financial abuses in the United States during the Great
Depression and the doctrinal underpinnings of the 1940 Act, with
specific emphasis placed upon issues of relevance to the derivatives
discussion. Part V discusses the ways in which current mutual fund
derivative trading practices may be misaligned with core 1940 Act
provisions and foundational doctrinal principles and proposes
legislative amendments and new regulations consistent with the
doctrinal bases of the 1940 Act. Part VI concludes.

II. DERIVATIVES: THE CURRENT PICTURE

A. OVERVIEW OF THE DERIVATIVES MARKET

The derivatives market has increased exponentially in the last
thirty years. 25 In December 2011, the estimated value of assets

Other Investment Companies, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter, SEC Fact
Sheet], www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-175.htm; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at
3.
24. 2012 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 7. At year-end 2011, U.S. mutual
fund assets totaled $11.6 trillion; U.S. ETF assets totaled $1 trillion; U.S. closed-end fund assets
totaled $239 billion; and U.S. UIT assets totaled $60 billion. Id. at 9. There were over 650
sponsors managing mutual fund assets in the U.S. in 2011. Id. at 24.
25. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 1.
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underlying exchange-traded derivatives contracts 26 was $56.6
trillion. 27 At the same time, the estimated principal amount of
transactions underlying over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives
contracts 28 was $647.8 trillion. 29 The value of the reference assets
underlying derivatives transactions is currently “several times the
world gross domestic product.” 30
The types of derivatives possible “are limited only by the
imagination of the prospective counterparties,” 31 with derivatives
based on concepts such as the weather, inflation, election results,
terrorism occurrences, airline seat availability, Higgs Boson discovery,
and “various so-called ‘synthetic’ securities, such as synthetic collateral
At their essence,
debt obligations and synthetic stocks.” 32
“[d]erivatives are literally bets—agreements between parties that one
will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by whether or
not a particular event occurs in the future.” 33
There are two main categories of derivatives: exchange-traded
derivatives and OTC derivatives. Exchange-traded derivatives are
standardized agreements that are traded on regulated exchanges, 34
including futures, 35 some options 36 and options on futures. 37 While
26. See infra text accompanying notes 33–41 discussing exchange-traded derivatives.
27. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Derivative Financial Instruments Traded on Organized
Exchanges, BIS.ORG (June 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1206_anx23a.pdf.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 42–52 discussing OTC derivatives.
29. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives,
BIS.ORG (Sept. 2012), http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. As discussed in Part
V(A)(1), infra, the market value of an OTC contract is not necessarily equivalent to the principal
amount of the transaction underlying such derivative contract (referred to as the “notional
amount”). For example, an OTC agreement to buy ten million U.S. dollars with euros in one year
at a certain exchange rate has an underlying principal amount of $10 million (the notional
amount), but the market value of the contract may only be $9 million. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1,
at 4. As of December 2011, the Bank for International Settlements estimated the gross market
value of outstanding over-the-counter contracts at $27.3 trillion. Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, BIS.ORG (Sept. 2012),
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf.
30. HULL, supra note 1, at 1.
31. Lynch, supra note 1, at 24–27 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. “Synthetic” derivatives are merely instruments that mimic the attributes of other
financial instruments. See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, J.P. Morgan’s Troubles and the Price of Eggs,
NPR.ORG (May 18, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/18/152934962/jpmorganstroubles-and-the-price-of-eggs.
33. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
1, 6 (2011) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
34. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 11. For a listing of major exchanges that
trade futures and options today, see, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 817.
35. Futures are exchange-traded contracts to buy or sell a specified asset at a fixed future
date and price. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 7. In order to facilitate trading and provide
mechanisms to protect parties against counterparty default, exchanges standardize the terms of
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exchange markets do not offer the flexibility of OTC markets, 38 they
have been quite effective at drastically reducing credit risk due to
margin account 39 and clearing requirements. 40 In fact, “[a]part from
the occasional market manipulation scandal (e.g., onions in the 1950s,
silver in the 1980s), during most of the twentieth century organized
the contract, including acceptable grades of the commodity to be delivered, the quantity to be
delivered, the delivery date (usually sometime within a specified month), position limits
(specifying the maximum amount of contracts that a trader may hold in order to prevent undue
influence on the market by speculators), intra-day price limits, and delivery arrangements. See,
e.g., id. at 24–26. Reference assets for futures contracts include financial assets, such as stock
indices, Treasury bonds and currencies, and commodities, such as sugar, wool, copper, gold,
aluminum, pork bellies and live cattle. See, e.g., id. at 7. In contrast to futures contracts, “spot
contracts” are agreements to buy or sell assets today. See, e.g., id. at 5.
36. An option is “an agreement, contract, or transaction that is of the character of, or is
commonly known to the trade as, an “option,” “privilege,” “indemnity,” “bid,” “offer,” “put,” “call,”
“advance guaranty,” or “decline guaranty.” Commodity Exchange Act (the “CEA”), 7 U.S.C. §
1a(36) (2006 & Supp. 2010). Practically speaking, options, which are traded both on exchanges
and OTC markets, are of two basic types. “Call options” confer on the holder the right to purchase
the underlying asset at a fixed price on a fixed date, while “put options” allow the holder the right
to sell the underlying asset at a fixed price on a fixed date. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, at 11
n.23; HULL, supra note 1, at 7. While the holder of an option has a right to buy or sell, the holder of
a future or forward contract is obligated to buy or sell. Id. at 8. Accordingly, options are sold for
a price, while futures and forwards have no up-front costs. Id. As with futures and forwards,
buyers of options acquire “long” positions, while sellers acquire “short” positions. See, e.g., id. at 9.
Selling an option is also referred to as “writing” the option. Id.
37. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 11.
38. OTC markets have historically allowed traders great flexibility to negotiate the terms of
their trades, but have also presented concerns of counterparty default and catastrophic financial
loss. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 3–4; see infra text accompanying notes 53–63. As discussed
herein, the Dodd-Frank Act, when effectuated, will completely overhaul the OTC derivatives
market. See infra Part II(B).
39. For example, to initiate a futures contract, an investor contacts his broker, who requires
the investor to deposit money in a margin account in the amount of the initial margin amount
required by the exchange. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 27. At the close of each trading day, the
investor’s gain or loss is reflected in the margin account in the process of daily settlement,
otherwise known as “marking-to-market.” See, e.g., id. at 27–28. If the reduction in the margin
account passes a limit set by the exchange referred to as the maintenance margin, which is lower
than the initial margin amount, the investor will receive a margin call and must deposit funds in
the margin account by the end of the next trading day in an amount equal to the initial margin
amount. See, e.g., id. at 28. The funds deposited in response to a margin call are referred to as the
“variation margin amount.” Id. If the investor fails to deposit the required funds, the broker will
close out the investor’s position. See, e.g., id. at 28–29. This process of daily marking-to-market
results in a futures contract effectively being closed out and reissued at an altered price every
trading day, whereas forward contracts, discussed in note 43, infra, are only settled at the end of
the contract. See, e.g., id. at 29.
40. HULL, supra note 1, at 3–4. Exchange clearing houses serve as intermediaries in futures
transactions, guaranteeing the performance of the parties on each side of the deal. See, e.g., id. at
29. Brokers that are not clearing house members must establish a margin account with such a
member, who, in turn, maintains a margin account with the clearing house (referred to as a
clearing margin). See, e.g., id. at 30. Clearing margin accounts are adjusted daily for gains and
losses, just as is the case with broker margin accounts and investor margin accounts. See, e.g., id.
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future exchanges functioned so smoothly they received little or no
media public attention.” 41 Even on October 19, 1987 (known in finance
circles as “Black Monday”), for example, when the S&P 500 index
plummeted by more than 20%, leaving long investors with negative
balances in their margin accounts, although some brokers went
bankrupt due to the failure of their investors to meet their margin
calls, the clearing houses ensured that all short futures investors
received their profits. 42
OTC derivatives, the newer category of derivatives, are negotiated
agreements that are executed without exchange involvement. OTC
derivatives include swaps, 43 forwards, 44 certain options, 45 and
“combination products” 46 such as forward swaps 47 and swaptions. 48
OTC derivative transactions (which historically have not been subject
to margin or clearing requirements) have often presented complexities
with respect to valuation, transferability and liquidation that do not
typically arise in connection with exchange-traded derivatives. 49 Due
to the counterparty credit risk issues presented by uncleared OTC
derivatives, parties have often entered into collateralization
agreements 50 designed to mimic the effect of the exchange margin
account process. 51 However, as discussed in Part II(B) herein, Title VII
41. Stout, supra note 33, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
42. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 30.
43. See supra note 13; see infra Part II(B) defining “swaps.”
44. A forward is an over-the-counter contract to buy or sell a specified asset at a fixed future
date and price. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 5. One party to a forward takes a long position,
while the other takes a short position. See, e.g., id. As forward contracts cost nothing to enter
into, each party’s payoff from the forward will be their gain or loss when the contract is
performed. See, e.g., id. at 6.
45. See supra note 36.
46. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 11–12.
47. A forward swap, also known as a “deferred swap,” is a contract to enter into a swap at a
date certain in the future. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 12 n.27.
48. A swaption is an agreement giving the holder the option to enter into an interest rate
swap exchanging a specified fixed rate for a floating rate. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra
note 1, at 12 n.26.
49. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that many OTC contracts
provide for non-transferability without counterparty consent or are too customized to attract
purchases).
50. See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 10; HULL, supra note 1, at 31. Although
the terms of collateralization agreements vary, a typical agreement might require daily valuation
of the transaction at issue, with losses required to be deposited in an interest-bearing security
account for the benefit of the other party. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 31.
51. The AIG bailout in 2008 highlights the disastrous effects of a failure to collateralize OTC
derivatives. By selling credit default swaps (described in note 97, infra), AIG in essence provided
insurance to buyers against credit risks related to very risky subprime mortgages. See, e.g., HULL,
supra note 1, at 33. Because AIG had an extremely high credit rating of AAA, the buyers of the
credit default swaps did not require collateralization which encouraged AIG to write an
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of the Dodd-Frank Act, when fully implemented, will completely
overhaul the OTC derivatives market, mandating new clearing,
reporting and execution requirements for “swaps” and “security-based
swaps.” As such, it is expected that the Dodd-Frank Act will serve to
greatly reduce the counterparty credit risks historically associated
with OTC derivatives. 52
Examples of disastrous losses that spotlight the dangerous nature
of derivatives trading are plentiful. Although some derivatives
catastrophes have resulted from rogue traders hiding fraudulent
trading activity from their employers, 53 a significant amount of damage
from derivatives trading has resulted from the simple inability of
financial professionals to understand the complexity and global
interconnectedness of the risks inherent in derivative trading, as was
evidenced by the 2008 financial meltdown, where venerable
institutions such as Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
insurance giant AIG were devastated by trading and speculation in
mortgage-backed bonds and derivatives. 54 “Banks and financial firms
began refusing to lend to each other out of fear that their counterparty
might already be insolvent due to bad derivatives bets. The Federal
Reserve was forced to act as a lender of last resort, injecting more than
$3.3 trillion in short-term loans and other assistance into the economy
to prevent collapse.” 55
astronomical amount of the instruments, since it could collect fees without any expenditure of its
own. As such, AIG failed to appreciate the risk that it had assumed. Id. When the subprime
market plummeted, AIG suffered huge losses on the credit default swaps, precipitating an $85
billion bailout by the U.S. government to prevent a systemic crash. Id.
52. That being said, because the clearing and margin requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act
will not apply to all swaps, collateralization agreements will continue to have applicability with
respect to uncleared swaps. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 33.
53. For example, in 2005, a Societe General junior trader, unbeknownst to the bank, created
fictitious trades to make it appear that he had hedged huge positions that he had taken in equity
indices; however, he had, in reality, assumed unhedged bets of over tens of billions of euros. See,
e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 17. When the bank discovered his fraud, it unwound his trades for a
total loss of 4.9 billion euros. Id.
54. Stout, supra note 33, at 26–29 (footnotes omitted). Numerous other factors have been
identified as having contributed to the crisis, including, rating inadequacies by the leading rating
agencies, slack lending standards by mortgage lenders, inadequate monetary policy, and
increased proprietary trading by banks. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 33, at 3 (citing FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT XV (2011) [hereinafter the 2011 CRISIS
REPORT]). It should be noted that the body of literature analyzing the crisis is quite extensive and
will continue to increase as distance provides increased perspective. See, e.g., 2011 CRISIS REPORT,
supra; ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2003); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN
BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010).
55. See supra note 54.

KIBBIE_EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

204

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

2/1/2013 12:15 AM

9:2

Additionally, “[r]ecent history is rife with [pre-2008] examples of
firms and municipalities suffering severe and sometimes disastrous
economic losses as a result of losing their derivatives bets.” 56
For example, Metallgesellschaft, formerly one of Germany’s
largest industrial conglomerates, lost approximately $1.4
billion in 1993 speculating in oil futures. Barings Bank went
bankrupt in 1995 after losing approximately $1.3 billion in
speculative derivatives . . . . In the mid-nineties, Orange County,
California lost $1.7 billion of taxpayer money on speculative
derivatives, and the Sumitomo Corporation lost an estimated
$2.6 billion on speculative derivatives, many of them copper
futures. The hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management lost
approximately $1.3 billion in 1998 speculatively selling
options . . . . More recently, IKB Deutsche Industriebank lost
approximately $4 billion in 2007, much of it speculating in
derivatives referencing American subprime mortgages. 57

The latest highly-publicized derivative disaster is J.P. Morgan’s
enormous $6 to $8 billion loss, 58 which has “cost the bank $17 billion of
market value and have tarnished the reputation of Chief Executive
James Dimon, long viewed as one of Wall Street’s savviest risk
managers.” 59
The foregoing losses have highlighted the potential for such
instruments to cause catastrophic systemic risk. 60 Because of the lack
of trading transparency, the high degree of interconnectedness among
global financial institutions, and the astronomical scale of derivatives
trading volume among them, a default by one institution could have an
almost instantaneous disastrous domino effect throughout the
financial industry. 61 During the crisis, in order to prevent a systemic

56. Lynch, supra note 1, at 7 (footnote omitted).
57. Lynch, supra note 1, at 7 (footnotes omitted). Numerous short-term government bond
funds and money market funds also incurred significant losses due to complex mortgage
derivatives in 1994. See infra text accompanying notes 226–27; see also, e.g., Eric D. Roiter,
Investment Companies’ Use of OTC Derivatives: Does the Existing Regulatory Regime Work?, 1 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 271, 273–74 (1995).
58. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Gregory Zuckerman, ‘Whale’ Tab Hits $5.8 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
July 14, 2012, at B1, B2. MF Global also made the news recently with its highly-publicized
derivatives losses. Gretchen Morgenson, Sad Proof of Europe’s Fallout, NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/business/in-mf-global-sad-proof-of-europes-fall
out.html?_r=0 (stating that “the brokerage firm . . . was felled by over-the-top leverage and bad
derivative bets on debt-weakened European countries”).
59. Gregory Zuckerman & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Unit Shifts Operations, WALL ST. J., June
25, 2012, at C1, C3.
60. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 172.
61. Id.
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crash, governments across the globe were forced to institute highly
publicized, costly bailout programs. 62 Thereafter, in September 2009,
G-20 leaders met and “agreed that swaps, which were basically not
regulated in the United States, Asia or Europe, should now be brought
into the light of regulation.” 63 The following Section briefly details U.S.
efforts in that regard.
B. DODD-FRANK ACT REFORMS

The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law by President Obama on July
21, 2010, establishes a “comprehensive new regulatory framework for
two broad categories of derivatives;” 64 “swaps,” 65 which will be
regulated by the CFTC, and “security-based swaps,” 66 which will be
regulated by the SEC. In practice, “swaps” may assume many forms, 67
with the number of “exotic” swaps increasing in recent years. It is

62. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 172.
63. Gary Gensler, CFTC Chairman, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture, (Washington D.C., July 17, 2012), available at www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-118 [hereinafter Gensler Testimony]. Due to the interconnected
global nature of the financial markets, global leaders are working to harmonize the derivatives
regulations worldwide, which is, of course, an intensely complicated endeavor. Id.
64. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 12.
65. A lengthy definition of the term “swap” is provided in section 1a(47) of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. §
1a(47) (Supp. 2010). Section 3(a)(69) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”) adopts the foregoing CEA definition. In addition to this statutory definition, the CFTC and
SEC have provided certain clarifications in their recent 600-page release. See Further Definition
of “Swap,” “Security-based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement,” Mixed Swaps; SecurityBased Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Securities Act Release No. 33-9338; 34-67453, File No.
S7-16-11 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter the Final Definitions Release]. An exhaustive exploration of
the statutory and regulatory parameters of the swap and security-based swap definitions is
beyond the scope of this Article.
66. A lengthy definition of the term “security-based swap” is provided in section 3(a)(68) of
the Exchange Act; section 1a(42) of the CEA adopts this definition. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(42) (Supp. 2010).
In addition to this statutory definition, the CFTC and SEC have provided certain clarifications in
the Final Definitions Release, supra note 65. As previously stated, an exhaustive exploration of
the statutory and regulatory parameters of the swap and security-based swap definitions is
beyond the scope of this Article.
67. For example, interest rate swaps are extremely common and include, without limitation,
“plain vanilla” interest rate swaps (exchanging a fixed rate on a principal amount for a specified
time period with a floating rate on the same principal for such period of time); overnight indexed
swaps (allowing overnight borrowing and lending by banks to be swapped for such activity at a
fixed rate); floating-for-floating interest rate swaps (exchanging two different floating rates, such
as LIBOR and the commercial paper rate); amortizing swaps; step-up swaps; forward swaps;
constant maturity swaps; constant maturity Treasury swaps; compounding swaps; and accrual
swaps. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 148, 174. Other common types of swaps are currency
swaps, equity swaps, commodity swaps, volatility swaps, and swaps imbedding options. See, e.g.,
id. at 174–75.
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expected that the counterparty credit risks historically associated with
many of such swaps will be alleviated with the Title VII Dodd-Frank
Act reforms when they are finally implemented. 68
Importantly, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act seeks “to reduce risk,
increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the
financial system,” 69 mandating new clearing, reporting and execution
mandates for both swaps and security-based swaps. 70 As in the
traditional exchange clearing mechanism discussed above, 71 a clearing
house will become the intermediary between the two parties to most
swap transactions and will assume the credit risk of both, requiring
initial and variation margins to prevent losses. 72 Although the goal of
these arrangements is to reduce systemic risk and increase
transparency in the OTC market, it remains to be seen how effective
these arrangements will prove. 73
Although a full discussion regarding the regulatory efforts to
implement the Dodd-Frank Act is beyond the scope of this Article, 74 it
has become apparent that crafting the precise definition of the three
main types of derivative trading activity 75—hedging, 76 speculating77
68. See infra notes 70–72.
69. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 12.
70. See, e.g., id. at 12 n.29. A full overview of these reforms, most of which have not yet been
implemented, is beyond the scope of this Article. As a result of the 2008 financial meltdown,
governments across the globe have enacted similar legislation requiring certain OTC derivative
transactions to pass through clearing houses. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 32.
71. See supra notes 37–41.
72. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1 at 32; Gensler Testimony, supra note 63, at 2–3.
73. The effect of over-the-counter clearing houses will depend on the number of such
clearing houses, as well as the proportion of trades that they clear. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at
32, note 2 (citing D. Duffie and H. Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty
Risk?, STAN. UNIV. WORKING PAPER (2010)).
74. For updated status information regarding Title VII rulemaking efforts, including the text
of proposed and final rules and posted comment letters, see the SEC’s website at
http://www.sec.gov and the CFTC’s website at http://www.cftc.gov. See also, e.g., Gensler
Testimony, supra note 62 (summarizing the status of CFTC rulemaking efforts); Summary of the
Dodd-Frank Act: Swaps and Derivatives, PRACTICALLAW.COM, http://u.s.-practicallaw.com/3-5028950 (last visited July 28, 2012) (providing a detailed overview of Title VII with frequently
updated regulatory information).
75. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 10–17.
76. Hedgers use derivative transactions to reduce their level of risk from changes in the
market. See, e.g., id. at 10; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5. For example, a fund that must
pay one million euros in three months may hedge against unfavorable exchange rate moves by
buying one million euros three months forward, thus effectively locking in its exchange rate. See,
e.g., supra note 43; HULL, supra note 1, at 10. For a description of various hedging strategies, see,
e.g., id. at 47–69.
77. Speculators increase their level or risk in the market by effectively taking a position in a
reference asset with only a small initial outlay in the derivative transaction. See, e.g., HULL, supra
note 1, at 10–15. As further discussed herein, speculative derivative transactions were at the
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and arbitraging78—has become a central issue for regulators. 79 As was
recently demonstrated by J.P. Morgan’s $6 billion to $8 billion
derivative loss, disastrous consequences can arise when a trader
charged with hedging risk or effectuating an arbitrage strategy either
consciously or unconsciously morphs into a speculator. 80
With respect to investment companies, the most controversial
reforms to date are those instituted by the Final CPO Rules, which
require registered investment companies “that engage in significant
commodity trading activity to register [with the CFTC] and report
certain information about their investments . . . .” 81 The mutual fund
industry is seeking to have such rules stricken in a federal lawsuit. 82
However, because such reforms are critical to mutual fund derivative
transparency and the prevention of systemic risk, it is important that
the CFTC act to ensure their implementation.
Despite the Sisyphean challenges that regulators face with respect
to the implementation of reforms, 83 one lesson to be learned from the
2008 crisis is that “law matters.” 84
heart of the recent financial meltdown. See supra text accompanying notes 53–63; see also, e.g.,
Stout, supra note 32, at 1 (asserting that speculative derivatives trading reduces social welfare).
78. Arbitrageurs exploit anomalies in the market by taking offsetting positions that result in a
net profit. See, e.g., HULL, supra note 1, at 10.
79. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Gregory Zuckerman, ‘Whale’ Tab Hits $5.8 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
July 14, 2012, at B1, B2; Carol E. Lee & Damian Paletta, White House Steps Up Push To Toughen
Rules on Banks, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2012, at A1, A6 (explaining the fight over whether to
incorporate hedging definitions based on the entire portfolio or individual trades with respect to
Dodd-Frank’s “Volker Rule); Katy Burne, Aaron Lucchetti & Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge or Bet?
Parsing a Trade, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2012, at C1, C2.
80. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Lessons from Trades Big and Bad, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2012, at B1, B3
(quoting J.P. Morgan’s chief executive, “What this hedge morphed into violates our own
principles”).
81. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 3; see also infra Part III(B).
82. See infra Part III(B). On December 12, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed the mutual fund industry’s lawsuit against the CFTC, but an appeal was
quickly filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Jamila Trindle,
Mutual Funds Appeal CFTC Rule, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at C2; Memorandum Opinion, Inv. Co.
Inst. v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv-00612 (D.D.C., June 18, 2012).
83. Such challenges include (1) jurisdictional complexities, (2) significant resistance from
industry groups and politicians, and (3) serious staffing and budgetary issues. See, e.g., Stout,
supra note 33, at 36; Julia La Roche, Here’s the Massive Chart Jamie Dimon Used To Explain Why
More Regulations Are Going To Screw Up Wall Street, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (April 5, 2012, 9:56 AM),
www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-jamie-dimon-letter-chart-2012-4; Gretchen Morgenson, At
JPMorgan, the Ghost of Dinner Parties Past, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, at BU1; New York Times
Editorial, Lost the Vote? Deny the Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at SR10 (detailing Republican
efforts to slash the CFTC’s budget to a mere $180 million and noting that “[w]ith 710 employees,
the C.F.T.C. is barely big enough for its current responsibilities, let alone its new mission under
Dodd-Frank to oversee the huge . . . [OTC] swaps market”).
84. Stout, supra note 33, at 37.
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[F]inancial markets, must be built on some underlying legal
infrastructure. (A completely “free” market without laws is a
Hobbesian world where the strong and fast seize what they
want from the weak and slow.) Without a deep understanding
of the nature and importance of the legal rules that organize
financial markets it is impossible either to understand the
markets, or to predict their behavior. 85

III. DERIVATIVES USE BY MUTUAL FUNDS

A. AN OVERVIEW

Mutual funds use derivatives for a variety of reasons, some of
which are very beneficial to investors. 86 For example, derivatives can
be very effective tools at hedging interest rate 87 and credit risks. 88
Derivatives are also useful to gain exposure to markets otherwise
difficult to access. 89 In fact, derivatives can sometimes provide greater
efficiency than transacting in the underlying reference asset, providing
increased liquidity at a lower cost. 90 The leverage inherent in

85. Stout, supra note 33, at 37.
86. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5.
87. By way of illustration, a fund owning bonds could hedge against a price decline in such
bonds due to increasing interest rates by entering into an interest rate swap. See, e.g., SEC
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 14–16.
88. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5. For instance, a fund that owns bonds
could use credit derivatives to protect against the risk that the issuer of the bonds will default or
that the bond will be downgraded. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 16–17.
89. This concept is illustrated by a fund’s routine use of foreign index futures to gain
exposure to foreign equity markets. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 17.
90. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5. For example, funds often use derivatives
to “equitize” cash, as explained by the ABA Task Force Report:
[W]hen a fund has a large cash position for a short amount of time, the fund can
acquire long futures contracts to retain (or gain) exposure to the relevant equity
market. When the futures contracts are liquid (as is typically the case for broad market
indices), the fund can eliminate the position quickly and frequently at lower costs than
had the fund actually purchased the reference equity securities.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 8 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 17 n.46. Another example in which derivatives can be more efficient than
transacting in the underlying asset involves the use of credit default swaps in lieu of purchasing
the referenced bonds. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 13, at 8; see also, e.g., SEC Concept
Release, supra note 1, at 17 n.43 and accompanying text. As noted by the SEC Concept Release,
“[i]ndustry participants believe that derivatives may also provide a more efficient hedging tool
than reducing exposure by selling individual securities, offering greater liquidity, lower roundtrip transaction costs, lower taxes, and reduced disruption to the portfolio’s longer-term
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derivatives transactions can also greatly magnify gains;91 however, the
converse is also true: such leverage can drastically magnify losses. 92
Further, derivatives present numerous very complex legal and
management issues for mutual funds, including issues with respect to
valuation, illiquidity, disclosure, accounting and counterparty risk. 93
As explained above, there is “is no source of reliable information
regarding the general use of derivatives by registered investment
companies,” 94 as much derivatives trading information has historically
not been required to be reported to any regulator. 95 However, it is
positioning.” SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 14 n.33 (citing Board Oversight of Derivatives,
Independent Directors Council Task Force Report (July 2008), available at http://www.ici.org/
pdf/ppr_08_derivatives.pdf [hereinafter the 2008 IDC Report]).
91. Notably, as the management fees that a fund typically charges are based on a percentage
of the fund’s assets, such managers may be incentivized to make riskier bets to increase fund
performance. See, e.g., Tim Adam & Andre Guettler, The Use of Credit Default Swaps by U.S. FixedIncome Mutual Funds, FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper No. 2011-01 (Nov. 19,
2010), available at www.fdic.gov.bank.analytical/cfr/2011/wp2011/CFR_WP_2011_01.pdf, at 5–
6.
[Existing] literature focuses on the strategies fund managers use to alter the
performance and risk characteristics of their funds. . . . [Some scholars] interpret the
mutual fund industry as a tournament. The winners of this tournament, i.e., the best
performing funds, receive the highest inflows of new money . . . . This benefits fund
managers because some of their compensation is linked to the size of the fund and
hence new fund inflows. Therefore, managers of underperforming funds have an
incentive to increase their funds’ risk levels in order to close the return gap with
competitor funds. Consistent with this prediction, the authors find that growthoriented U.S. mutual funds, which underperformed during the first half of a fiscal year,
increase fund volatility in the second half of the fiscal year to a greater extent that
overperforming funds. . . . [Other scholars] argue that managers of underperforming
funds face a higher risk of job termination that managers of overperforming funds.
Underperforming managers therefore have an incentive to increase fund risk in order
to increase the chance to exceed the termination threshold. Finally, . . . [some] find
that younger funds are more likely to participate in the tournament game than older
funds. . . . [This article] adds to this strand of literature by showing that
underperforming corporate bond funds increase risk by increasing the size of their short,
multi-name . . . [credit default swap] positions.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added);; see also, e.g., Mutual Funds and
Derivative Instruments, United States Securities and Exchange Commission Division of
Investment Management Memorandum transmitted by Chairman Levitt to Representatives
Markey and Fields (Sept. 26, 1994) [hereinafter the 1994 Report], at 13 (noting that studies
demonstrate that investor money flows to the “funds with superior near-term performance” and
that “competition may . . . play some role in encouraging mutual fund use of derivatives to
enhance yield”).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 54–63 (discussing various derivative disasters); see
also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5.
93. See infra Part V; see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5.
94. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 42 (emphasis added) (citing Final CPO
Rules at 11,275).
95. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 15 (citing Final CPO Rules at 11,253).
As discussed in Part III(B), infra, the Final CPO Rules require a significant amount of such
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widely accepted that derivatives use by investment companies has
soared beyond the regulatory framework of the 1940 Act. 96 The
fragments of information that are available highlight the need for
attention to this issue.
Although specific numbers are not available, numerous agency
representatives have noted the disconcerting levels of derivatives use
by mutual funds; Andrew Donohue, then-Director of the SEC’s Division
of Investment Management, explained:
I have, for some time, made no secret of my concerns regarding
funds’ use of derivatives and my belief that these instruments,
while affording the opportunity for efficient portfolio
management and risk mitigation, also can present potentially
significant additional risk as well as raise issues of investor
protection. As funds’ investments in these instruments are
increasing, and the spectrum of derivative instruments
available continuously broadening . . . I would like to reiterate
my concerns . . . .

In the past two decades, the investment company marketplace
has been significantly reshaped by the use of derivative
instruments. During this period, investment companies have
moved from relatively modest participation in derivatives
transactions limited to hedging or other risk management
purposes to a broad range of strategies that rely upon
derivatives as a substitute for conventional securities. Mutual
funds that mimic hedge fund strategies, typically involving
derivative products, have become commonplace.
New
categories of investment companies have emerged: absolute
return funds, commodity return funds, alternative investment
funds, long-short funds and leveraged and inverse index funds,
among others.
It is also not uncommon for investment companies with
traditional investment objectives to obtain synthetic market
exposure through derivative products, such as credit default
swaps, rather than invest directly in the underlying “cash”
market. The embrace of derivatives by investment companies
may be most dramatically illustrated by funds, such as
leveraged ETFs, which are designed for the singular purpose of

information to be reported to the CFTC.
96. See infra Part III.
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achieving a leveraged return through the use of derivatives, in
most cases to a degree not possible using traditional
investments. 97

One recent study offering concrete numbers examined the use of
credit default swaps 98 by the 100 largest U.S. bond funds. 99 Although
fixed-income mutual funds are perceived by most to be relatively safe
investment vehicles, by 2008, the top 100 corporate bond funds in the
United States were “as likely to hold . . . [credit default swap] positions
as hedge funds were to hold derivatives.” 100 As previously discussed,
credit default swaps, which have been referred to as “financial
weapons of mass destruction,” 101 are the well-known cause of
disastrous losses during the recent financial crisis. 102 The study found
that, while 20% of such funds used credit default swaps in 2004, 60%
were using them in 2008. 103 The study also found that the average
credit default swap position of such funds increased from 2% of net
97. Andrew J. Donohue, Dir. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff:
Remarks Before the Practicing Law Institute's Investment Management Institute 2010 (Apr. 8,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch040810ajd.htm [hereinafter 2010 Donohue
Speech] (emphasis added); see also, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 9 (detailing the
“extensive” use of derivatives by some investment companies). It should be noted that the SEC’s
Division of Investment Management recently advised that it would once again begin considering
the use of derivatives by actively-managed ETFs under certain conditions, a reversal of the SEC’s
position in March 2010 deferring consideration of exemptive requests relating to derivatives use
by such ETFs. See, e.g., Joe Light, Make Way for Active ETFs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29-30, 2012, at B8.
However, such consideration will not extend to leveraged and inverse ETF products. See, e.g., id.
98. Credit default swaps are agreements “in which the protection seller agrees to make a
payment to the protection buyer in the event of a specified credit event (such as a default on an
interest or principal payment of a reference entity) in exchange for a fixed payment or series of
payments.” INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS COUNCIL, BOARD OVERSIGHT OF DERIVATIVES: INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS COUNCIL TASK FORCE REPORT 6 (July 2008), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
ppr_08_derivatives.pdf. For a detailed example of how a fund uses a credit default swap in order
to obtain exposure to a corporate debt issuer, see id. at D3–D4 (Example 2).
99. Adam & Guettler, supra note 91; see generally Robert W. Helm, David M. Geffen &
Stephanie A. Capistron, Mutual Funds’ Use of Credit Default Swaps—Part 1, 16 THE INVESTMENT
LAWYER 1, (December 2009); Robert W. Helm, David M. Geffen, & Stephanie A. Capistron, Mutual
Funds’ Use of Credit Default Swaps—Part II, 17 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 1 (2010).
100. Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 16. Fixed-income mutual funds use credit default
swaps mainly to assume credit risk and leverage and not to hedge. Id. See Lewis Braham, Credit
Default Swaps: Is Your Fund at Risk?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2008),
www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-02-20/credit-default-swaps-is-your-fund-at-risk.
101. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2002 Annual Report 15, http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
2002ar/2002ar.pdf; see also Lynch, supra note 1, at 9. Of course, it must be noted that credit
default swaps have very beneficial uses as well.
102. See, e.g., Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 1. AIG, the largest insurance company in the
world, was “brought to the brink of collapse due to its . . . [credit default swap] positions.” Id.
103. Id. at 2; see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
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asset value in 2004 to approximately 14% in 2008. 104 Although credit
default swaps represented less than 10% of net asset value for most
funds, certain funds exceeded this percentage by a large margin, with
the notional values of credit default swap positions exceeding 50% of
net asset value for six funds in the sample. 105 In fact, the credit default
swap notional values of three funds actually exceeded the net asset
values of such funds in 2008, 106 with one fund losing 74% of its net
asset value due in part to its large position in credit default swaps. 107
One reason that the level of derivative use by mutual funds has
been difficult to ascertain is due to funds’ increasing investments
through controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) and non-registered
investment vehicles that have the effect of masking transparency of the
mutual funds’ actual exposures. 108 Concerned about the widespread
use of CFCs and other vehicles, the National Futures Association
(“NFA”) 109 in June 2010 petitioned the CFTC “to amend Regulation
[CFTC] 4.5(c) to restore operating restrictions on registered
investment companies that are substantially similar to those in effect
prior to 2003.” 110 Specifically, the NFA Petition requested the CFTC to
reverse its 2003 regulations exempting registered investment
104. Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 2. The size of the position was measured by the
notional value of the credit default swaps relative to the net asset value of the bond fund. Id. For
a discussion regarding various valuation methods, see infra Part V(A)(1).
105. Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 2 n.3. Such funds included the Intermediate Term
Bund Fund (First American Investment Funds), the Oppenheimer Champion Income fund, the
Putnam Diversified Income Trust, the Putnam Income Fund, the Western Asset Core Bond
Portfolio, and the Western Asset Core Plus Bond Portfolio. Id.
106. Id. at 12.
107. Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 12–13; see also, e.g., 2009 Donohue Speech, supra note
23, (referencing one-year losses by “a number of” fixed income funds in excess of 30% and
suggesting that derivatives use may have been a significant factor in such losses).
108. In order to obtain favorable pass-through tax treatment, registered investment
companies must comply with Subchapter M under the Internal Revenue Code, which, in essence,
provides that a fund’s income will only be taxed at the shareholder level (and not at the fund
level) if, among other things, at least 90% of the fund’s income is derived from stocks and
securities (“Qualifying Income”); although direct investments by a fund in commodities and
certain derivatives would not constitute Qualifying Income, indirect investments in such assets
through a CFC would constitute Qualifying Income. See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. Response to Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations Hearing on “Compliance with Tax Limits on Mut. Fund Commodity
Speculation” (Jan. 26, 2012). For a discussion regarding such tax issues, which are beyond the
scope of this Article, see, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., Letter from Senator Carl Levin, Chairman,
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n (Mar. 19, 2012).
109. The NFA is “the primary self-regulatory organization . . . in the derivatives industry . . . .”
CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 11.
110. Petition for Rulemaking to Amend CFTC Regulation 4.5, National Futures Association
(June 29, 2010), www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsPetition.asp?ArticleID=2491 [hereinafter NFA
Petition].
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companies from CFTC supervision as “commodity pool operators”
(“CPOs”). 111
In its petition, the NFA alerted the CFTC that certain mutual
funds were exploiting SEC regulations and IRS letter rulings to
market “manufactured futures strateg[ies]” to U.S. investors,
executed through subsidiaries neither registered with the CFTC
nor the SEC, and “not subject to the Investment Company Act of
1940’s customer protection regime.” . . . Under this technique,
a parent company would register with the SEC as a . . .
[registered investment company] and would hold ordinary
assets such as money market instruments, but would use those
assets as collateral for derivatives trading by its subsidiary . . . .
The investments would be highly leveraged to achieve
derivatives exposure equal to the full net value of the fund . . . .
The unregistered subsidiary would invest, for example, in
“exchange traded futures and options contracts, forward
contracts, swaps, and other over the counter derivatives and
fixed income securities,” yet “the subsidiaries’ daily operations,
including their actual derivatives positions (including the
positions’ leverage amounts) and fees charged” would be
allowed to remain “not entirely transparent.” . . . Investments
in the parent . . . [registered investment company] would then
be “marketed to consumers, including retail investors, as
commodity futures investments. . . . According to NFA,
exemplar “offering material omit[ted] substantial disclosures”
to investors “that would otherwise be mandated by” CFTC
regulations . . . .” 112

As of December 2011, approximately seventy-two mutual funds
were using CFCs (commonly set up in the Cayman Islands) to
circumvent U.S. regulation and taxation. 113 “That the Cayman CFCs are
empty shells designed to allow U.S. mutual funds to create commodity
111. The Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to provide that a “commodity pool operator”
includes “any person or entity operating a business in which they solicit or accept value for the
purpose of trading in commodity interests, including any commodity future, option, swap, or
certain other specified instruments.” CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 5
(quoting § 1a(11)(A) of the CEA) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 11–12 (citations omitted).
113. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 12. One such fund “reported having
over $22 billion invested in commodity related assets with approximately 900,000 investors,
75% of which [we]re individuals.” Id. at 12–13 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Letter
from Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 20, 2011)
[hereinafter the Levin-Coburn Letter], at 3) (internal quotations omitted).
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related investment portfolios, run by their own U.S. employees, is
openly acknowledged.” 114
After a long and robust comment period, the CFTC acted on the
NFA Petition and promulgated the Final CPO Rules in February 2012,
the details of which are beyond the scope of this Article, but due to
their importance to the discussion herein, are briefly summarized
below.

B. THE FINAL CPO RULES AND THE FEDERAL LAWSUIT BY THE MUTUAL FUND
INDUSTRY CHALLENGING SAME

Pursuant to the Final CPO Rules 115 (filling ninety-one pages in the
Federal Register), amended Rule 4.5 allows a registered investment
company to qualify for exclusion from CPO regulation “if, inter alia, its
trading in commodity futures, commodity options, or swaps does not
exceed one of two thresholds: (1) 5 percent or less of its portfolio
liquidation value is used for initial margin and premiums; or (2) the
net notional value of all such investments does not exceed 100 percent
of the liquidation value of the pool’s portfolio.” 116 Importantly, under
either threshold above, funds may “exclude all bona fide hedging
transactions from the calculation.” 117 The amended rule also provides
marketing restrictions to investment companies claiming the exclusion
from CPO status. 118
The Final CPO Rules also amend CFTC Rule 4.7 to require detailed
reporting by registered CPOs regarding derivatives positions,
“information concerning derivatives trading that . . . registered
investment companies do not currently report to any regulator.” 119
Additional compliance obligations with respect to registered CPOs that
114. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 12 (quoting the Levin-Coburn Letter, at
3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. For a complete discussion, see, e.g., Final CPO Rules, supra note 6; Complaint, Inv. Co. Inst.
v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv-00612, 2012 WL 129673 (Dist. D. C., Apr.
17, 2012) [hereinafter the ICI Complaint]; CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5.
116. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 14 (citing Final CPO Rules, at 11,283).
The net notional test defines notional value by asset class and provides that certain asset classes
may net notional values under certain circumstances. See Final CPO Rules, at 11,257-58.
117. Id.
118. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 14 (citing Final CPO Rules, at 11,283–
59).
119. Id. at 14–16 (citing Final CPO Rules, at 11,252). For a summary of such reporting
requirements, see, e.g., id.
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are also registered investment companies are being crafted by both the
CFTC and the SEC, in an effort to harmonize rulemaking efforts. 120
The mutual fund industry is challenging the Final CPO Rules. On
April 17, 2012, the Investment Company Institute (the “ICI”) 121 and the
Chamber of Commerce of Commerce of the United States of America
(the “Chamber”) brought suit against the CFTC in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia seeking to invalidate the Final CPO
Rules. 122 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
the lawsuit on December 12, 2012, but the ICI and Chamber quickly
filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
123
Columbia on December 27, 2012. The suit alleges violations of the
CEA and the Administrative Procedures Act (i.e., insufficient evaluation
of costs and benefits, arbitrary and capricious agency action, and
failure to provide an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the
rulemaking, among other claims). 124 No matter the outcome of this
litigation, the mutual fund industry has made it clear that it is
determined to resist certain regulatory reforms. 125
120. CFTC Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 5, at 16 (citing Harmonization of
Compliance Obligations for Registered Investment Companies Required to Register as CPOs, 77
Fed. Reg. 11,345 (Feb. 24, 2012)).
121. ICI “is an association that represents United States registered investment companies . . . .”
ICI Complaint, supra note 114, at 6.
122. See ICI Complaint, supra note 114, at 1. Notably, the suit is brought by Eugene Scalia,
whose father is Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Chris Dolmetsch & Robert Schmidt, CFTC
Sued By Fund Industry To Overturn Registration Rule, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Apr. 17, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/46898?type=bloomberg. The younger Scalia
has won four cases in recent years challenging SEC regulations, and another in late September
2012 challenging a CFTC regulation that was designed to limit speculative trading, which case the
CFTC is appealing. See, e.g., id.; David Clarke & Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. Trade Groups Sue CFTC Over
Mutual Fund Rule, THOMSONREUTERS.COM (Apr. 17, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.
com/Securities/News/2012/04_-_April/U_S_trade_groups_sue_CFTC_over_mutual_fund_rule/;
Alexandra Alper, U.S. Court Throws Out Landmark Commodity Trading Crackdown,
THOMSONREUTERS.COM (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE88R
1FN20120928; Emily Stephenson, Trade Groups Appeal U.S. Decision on CFTC Mutual Funds Rule,
THOMSONREUTERS.COM (Dec. 27, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/
News/2012/12__December/Trade_groups_appeal_U_S_decision_on_CFTC_mutual_funds_rule/._
123. See, e.g., Jamila Trindle, Mutual Funds Appeal CFTC Rule, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 2012, at C2;
Memorandum Opinion, Inv. Co. Inst. v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 1:12-cv00612 (D.D.C., June 18, 2012)
124. ICI Complaint, supra note 115, at 3.
125. Another example of the industry’s resistance to reform efforts hit the papers recently in
the context of its opposition to the SEC’s proposals to shore up the money market rules. See, e.g.,
Floyd Norris, Funds and Allies Defend the Buck, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at B1, B6 (noting that the
SEC’s efforts are “being fought bitterly by the fund companies and by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, which has established a Web site and blanketed the Washington subway station near
the S.E.C. offices with ads denouncing such rules as outrageous”).
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IV. THE LESSONS OF 1940: DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
1940 ACT

Against the current snapshot of derivative markets provided in
Parts II and III, this Part offers a retrospective look at investment
company abuses during the Great Depression and the doctrinal
underpinnings of the 1940 Act, with specific emphasis on issues of
relevance to the derivatives discussion. 126
A. AN OVERVIEW

In the turbulent years following the Great Stock Market Crash of
1929, endemic problems in the then-unregulated investment company
industry became distressingly manifest. 127
The close relationships between investment companies and
their sponsors proved disastrous as a group of unscrupulous
sponsors treated fund assets as their own. Many funds failed,
and many shareholders lost their investments. The SEC
estimated that between 1929 and 1936, investment company
shareholders lost 40 per cent of their investments. 128
The widespread abuse precipitated Congress to commission a
comprehensive study of the investment company industry in 1935,
referred to as the “Investment Trust Study,” which confirmed virulent
fraudulent activity. 129
The Investment Trust Study, and the subsequent Congressional
hearings, found that, to an alarming extent, investment
companies were being organized and operated to benefit the
126. For a thorough history of the regulation of derivatives, including the legislative history of
the CEA, see Stout, supra note 33, at 11–31.
127. Remarks by Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Before the
American Law Institute/American Bar Association Investment Company Regulation and
Compliance Conference, The Exciting World of Investment Company Regulation (June 14, 2001),
reproduced in TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 30–33, at
32 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Roye Speech]; see also, e.g., Kelly S. Kibbie, The Newly-Mandated
Myopia of Rule 10b-5: Pay No Attention To that Manager Behind the Mutual Fund Curtain (to be
printed in 78 MO. L. REV. 1)(2013).
128. Roye Speech, supra note 126, at 32; see also, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 130 S. Ct.
1418, 1422 (2010) (explaining that the 1940 Act was premised on Congress’ “concern with the
potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies” and its realization “that
the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser was fraught with potential conflicts of
interest . . . .”) (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
129. Roye Speech, supra note 126, at 32.
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interests of their affiliates rather than the interests of their
shareholders. The highly liquid nature of fund assets made
them easy targets for embezzlement by affiliates, who often
viewed them as a source of private capital. Transactions
between investment companies and their affiliates, which were
expressly permitted to allow investment companies to
participate in the business dealings of affiliated financial firms,
often resulted in improper transactions.
Underwriters found it convenient to dump into the portfolios
of affiliated funds securities that they found to be
unmarketable.
Furthermore, investment companies were structured to ensure
that they remained under the control of their sponsors . . .

Finally, the fact that investment companies generally attracted
small, unsophisticated investors, allowed sponsors to mislead
these investors as to the actual nature of their investment.
These investors often did not understand their rights, the sales
charges they were obligated to pay, or how the investment
company’s manager was managing the company’s assets. 130

The investment company industry of 1930s post-Crash America
was so corrupt that it was characterized as a “parasite upon the stream
of industrial earnings.” 131
This stark landscape motivated Congress, the SEC and the
industry to work together to craft the 1940 Act, which was “truly a
negotiated statute.” 132 The 1940 Act is a complex, creative statute that
built on concepts from the banking laws, the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act,
the Chandler Act (regulating bankruptcies), the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, and the Civil Aeronautics Act. 133 The end result

130. Roye Speech, supra note 126, at 32.
131. Id. at 32–33.
132. Id. at 33.
133. Kibbie, supra note 125 (citing Roye Speech, supra note 126, at 33). As noted by the thenDirector of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, “Louis Loss called the 1940 Act ‘the
most complex of the entire SEC series’ as reflective of the fact that it specifically addresses
virtually every aspect of investment companies’ operations.” Speech by SEC Staff: Luncheon
Address Before a Meeting of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Assoc. Comm. on
Federal Regulation of Securities, by Andrew J. Donohue, Director of Investment Management, U.S.
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Denver, Co., Apr. 24, 2010), reprinted in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE 2011, PLI ORDER NO. 28697
(Practicing Law Institute, ed., Feb. 10-11, 2011).
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was a statute specifically designed to deal with the unique complexities
of the investment company industry.
Several doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act are specifically
implicated in the derivatives discussion herein. Those include
restrictions regarding “senior securities” (discussed in Section B);
requirements regarding diversification classification (discussed in
Section C); restrictions regarding exposure to “securities-related
issuers” (discussed in Section D); and restrictions regarding portfolio
concentration (discussed in Section E).
B. RESTRICTIONS REGARDING “SENIOR SECURITIES”

A “core purpose” of the drafters of the 1940 Act was to protect
investors against the dangers of “senior securities.” 134 Section 18(g) of
the 1940 Act defines “senior securities,” in pertinent part, as “any
bond, debenture, note, or similar obligation or instrument constituting
a security and evidencing indebtedness,” as well as “any stock of a class
having priority over any other class as to the distribution of assets or
The 76th Congress was specifically
payment of dividends.” 135
concerned about abuses during the 1920s and 1930s of senior security
holders by investment companies; sponsors would commonly keep
“junior, voting securities for themselves [so that] they could operate
the company in their own interests,” while selling the risky senior
securities “to the public as low risk investments.” 136 Further, Congress
was concerned about investment companies that had unduly increased
the speculative nature of their junior securities by issuing excessive
amounts of senior securities and by borrowing excessively. 137
Investment companies using excessive amounts of leverage were
134. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(g) (2006); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19
(emphasis added). The statutory definition excludes certain temporary borrowings.
136. See, e.g., Memorandum transmitted by Chairman Levitt to Representatives Markey &
Fields, Mut. Funds & Derivative Instruments, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Inv. Mgmt. (Sept. 26,
1994) [hereinafter the 1994 Report], at 23 (discussing other abusive practices, such as
pyramiding and issuing multiple classes of senior securities); SEC Concept Release, supra note 1,
at 19; Comm’r Robert Healy, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Inv. Trusts and Inv. Co.: Hearings on S.
2580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt.
1, 265–78 (1940) [hereinafter the 1940 Senate Hearings].
137. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(7) (2006); Sec.
Trading Practices of Registered Inv. Co., Inv. Co. Act Release No. 10666, 44 F.R. 25128 (Apr. 18,
1979) [hereinafter Release 10666], at n.8.
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essentially operating without sufficient assets and reserves. 138
The 1940 Act is prefaced with the following declaration:
[I]t is hereby declared that the national public interest and the
interest of investors are adversely affected— . . .

(3) when investment companies . . . fail to protect the
preferences and privileges of the holders of their
outstanding securities;
...
(7) when investment
companies by excessive
borrowing and the issuance of excessive amounts of
senior securities increase unduly the speculative
character of their junior securities; or
(8) when investment companies operate without
adequate assets or reserves.

It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this
title . . . are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the
conditions enumerated in this section which [sic] adversely
affect that national public interest and the interest of
investors. 139
Congress set forth limitations regarding an investment company’s
use of senior securities in Section 18(f) of the 1940 Act, which prohibits
an open-end investment company140 from issuing or selling “any senior
security of which it is the issuer,” except that such investment company
may “borrow from any bank” if “immediately after any such borrowing
there is an asset coverage of at least 300 per centum for all borrowings
of such registered company . . . .” 141 “Asset coverage” is defined in
section 18(h) of the 1940 Act as “the ratio which the value of the total
assets of such issuer, less all liabilities and indebtedness not
138. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19; Release 10666, supra note 137, at
25130 n.8.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2006) (emphasis supplied). See infra note 245 regarding additional
nuances of the senior security definition.
140. An “open-end company” is defined in section 5(a)(1) of the 1940 Act as “a management
company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable security of which it is the
issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(1) (2006). Mutual funds are open-end funds.
Congress also set forth senior security restrictions for closed-end funds and business
development companies in sections 18(a)(1) and 61(a)(1). 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-18(a)(1), 61(a)(1)
(2006). As previously stated, a specific discussion regarding derivatives use by investment
companies other than mutual funds is beyond the scope of this Article.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 19. See infra note 245 regarding additional nuances of the senior security
definition.

KIBBIE_EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

220

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

2/1/2013 12:15 AM

9:2

represented by senior securities, bears to the aggregate amount of
senior securities representing indebtedness of such issuer.” 142
As discussed in Part V(B), the SEC has recognized that the use of
derivatives by investment companies may involve the issuance of
senior securities, resulting in violations of the provisions and doctrinal
policies discussed above.
C. REQUIREMENTS REGARDING DIVERSIFICATION

Under the 1940 Act, mutual funds must specify whether they are
“diversified” 143 or “non-diversified” 144 in their registration
statements. 145 Once this designation is made, a diversified fund must
remain diversified unless it obtains shareholder approval to become
non-diversified. 146
In enacting the foregoing diversification requirements, Congress
was attempting to thwart the specific abuses outlined in Section A
above and “to prevent a fund that holds itself out as diversified from
being too closely tied to the success of one or a few issuers or
controlling portfolio companies.” 147 Further “the requirements are
142. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(h) (2006). For examples of asset ratio calculations, see, e.g., Dreyfus
Strategic Investing and Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (June 22, 1987)
[hereinafter the Dreyfus No-Action Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment/seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm; and Merrill Lynch Asset Management, L.P., SEC
Staff No-Action Letter (July 2, 1996), available at www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/
seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm [hereinafter the Merrill No-Action Letter].
143. Pursuant to § 5(b)(1) of the 1940 Act, a “diversified company” is a fund that “with respect
to 75% of the value of its total assets (the ‘75 bucket’), has (among other things) no more than 5%
of the value of its total assets invested in the securities of any one issuer.” SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 49 (footnotes omitted). Further, with respect to the 75% bucket, a diversified
fund is prohibited from owning more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of any single
issuer. Id. Rule 5b-1 under the 1940 Act defines “total assets” as “the gross assets of the company
with respect to which the computation is made, taken as of the end of the fiscal quarter of the
company last preceding the date of computation.” 17 C.F.R. § 270.5b-1 (2010); see also, e.g., SEC
Concept Release, supra, at 49 n. 127. Sections 2(a) and 2(a)(22) of the 1940 Act define “issuer” as
follows: “unless the context otherwise requires, . . . every person who issues or proposes to issue
any security, or has outstanding any security which it has issued.” SEC Concept Release, supra, at
49 n.128 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a), 80a-2(a)(22) (2006)).
144. Pursuant to § 5(b)(2) of the 1940 Act, a “non-diversified company” is “any management
company other than a diversified company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(2) (2006).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 49
n.125 (citing SEC Form N-1A (Items 16, 4(a) and 4(b)(1)) and Form N-2 (Item 17)).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(1) (2006); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 49.
147. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 49 (citing the 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note
134, at 188 (Statement of David Schenker, SEC Investment Trust Study Chief Counsel, regarding a
draft of § 5(b)(1) similar to the current statute)).
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designed to ensure that investors receive a clear statement of the
character of the portfolio of the fund in which they are invested, and
are intended to prevent any diversified fund from becoming nondiversified without the prior approval of its shareholders.” 148
Section 1(b)(6) of the 1940 Act expressly states that “the national
public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected . . .
when investment companies . . . change the character of their
business . . . without the consent of their security holders.” 149
Part V(C) below discusses specific issues that derivative
transactions by mutual funds present with respect to the foregoing
1940 Act diversification requirements, as well as proposed legislative
and regulatory fixes regarding the same.
D. RESTRICTIONS REGARDING EXPOSURE TO SECURITIES-RELATED ISSUERS

Section 12(d)(3) of the 1940 Act generally prohibits investment
companies from (1) purchasing or otherwise acquiring any security
that is issued by an underwriter, broker, dealer or investment adviser
(collectively, “securities related issuers”) and (2) acquiring any other
interest in the business of a securities related issuer. 150
There are two reasons for this prohibition. First, it limits a
fund’s exposure to the entrepreneurial risks of securitiesrelated issuers, including the fund’s potential inability to
extricate itself from an illiquid investment in a securities-related
issuer. Second, it is one of several . . . [1940 Act] provisions
which [sic], taken together, prohibit fund sponsors, which also
include broker-dealers, underwriters, and investment advisers,
from taking advantage of the funds that they sponsor.
Specifically, the prohibition has the effect of limiting the
possibility of abusive reciprocal practices between funds and
securities-related issuers. 151
As discussed above in Section A, the abuses by fund sponsors in
the Great Depression were many. 152 Reciprocal abusive practices have
also been a constant concern of the SEC and Staff:
148. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 49–50 (footnotes omitted) (citing Alfred Jaretzki,
Jr., The Investment Company Act of 1940, WASH. U. L.Q. 303, 314, 316–17 (April 1941)).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(6) (2006).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(3) (2006); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 57.
151. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 57–58 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see
also, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 31.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 125–31.
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Such reciprocal practices include the possibility that an
investment company might purchase securities or other
interests in a broker-dealer to reward that broker-dealer for
selling fund shares, rather than solely on investment merit.
Similarly, . . . an investment company might direct brokerage to
a broker-dealer in which the company has invested to enhance
the broker-dealers profitability or to assist it during financial
difficulty, even though that broker-dealer may not offer the
best price and execution. 153
Section 1(b)(2) of the 1940 Act states that “the national public
interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . when
investment companies are organized, operated managed, or when
their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors,
officers, investment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons
thereof, in the interest of underwriters, brokers or dealers . . . rather
than in the interest of all classes of such companies’ security
holders[.]” 154
Part V(D) below discusses issues that derivative transactions by
mutual funds present with respect to Section 12(d)(3) prohibitions, as
well as proposed regulatory solutions.

E.

RESTRICTIONS REGARDING PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION

Section 8(b)(1)(E) of the 1940 Act requires investment companies
to disclose their policies regarding “concentrating investments in a
particular industry or group of industries” in their registration
statements. 155 The doctrinal policies regarding this requirement are
similar to those supporting the diversification requirements discussed
in Part IV(C) above. 156
This requirement reflects the view that . . . [a portfolio
concentration policy] is likely to be central to a fund’s ability to achieve
its investment objectives, and that a fund that concentrates its
investments will be subject to greater risks than funds that do not
153. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 58 (quoting Exemption for Acquisition by Registered
Investment Companies of Securities Issued by Persons Engaged Directly or Indirectly in Securities
Related Businesses, Investment Company Act Release No. 13725, 49 Fed. Reg. 9652 (Jan. 17,
1984), at n.9 and accompanying text).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(2) (2006).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(1)(E) (2006); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 64 (citing
Form N-1A (Items 4, 9 (instruction 4) and 16(c)(1)(iv)) and Form N-2 (Items 8.2.b(2) and
17.2.e)).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 142–47.
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follow the policy. The concentration requirements also are intended to
prevent funds from substantially changing the nature and character of
their businesses without shareholder approval. 157
As with the diversification requirements, an investment company
is prohibited from changing its concentration policy as set forth in its
registration statement unless it obtains shareholder approval. 158
Part V(E) discusses issues that derivative transactions by mutual
funds present with respect to concentration requirements, as well as
proposed regulatory solutions.

V. CERTAIN CORE 1940 ISSUES ACT WITH RESPECT TO
DERIVATIVES TRANSACTIONS

Since 1940, the mutual fund industry 159 has grown and evolved
beyond anything the 76th Congress could have possibly imagined. In
1940, there were 68 mutual funds, with total assets of $450 million;
today there are 7,637 mutual funds with total net assets of $11.6
trillion. 160 Further, as specifically relevant to the discussion herein, the
complex derivatives widely used today did not exist in 1940. 161
Against this backdrop, this Part examines several core 1940 Act
issues with respect to derivatives transactions by mutual funds. 162 As
neither the 1940 Act nor the rules promulgated thereunder specifically
address the complicated issues created by mutual funds’ use of
derivatives, numerous areas of misalignment arise between current
industry practice, on the one hand, and law and foundational policies,
157. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 64 (footnotes omitted).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (2006); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 64.
See Part IV(C) for the doctrinal considerations behind this requirement.
159. In addition to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the rules promulgated
thereunder, investment companies are also subject to the statutory and regulatory provisions of
the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, the CTA, the Internal Revenue Code and Regulation T of the Federal
Reserve Board. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 4 n.2.
160. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 134.
161. See supra note 11; see also infra note 243 (discussing the 1940 Act’s prohibitions on
purchasing securities on margin and short selling securities in contravention of SEC rules,
regulations or orders).
162. Due to the complex nature of both the 1940 Act and derivative transactions in general,
issues other than those addressed herein arise under the statute. See, e.g., ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 14, at 36–37 (discussing 1940 Act liquidity issues); id. at 37–39 (discussing
1940 Act custody issues); id. at 39–42 (discussing 1940 Act issues with respect to fund names
and disclosure issues); id. at 42–43 (discussing compliance programs); id. at 43–46 (discussing
board oversight issues); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 6, 8; 2009 Donohue
Speech, supra note 23, at 4).
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on the other. Arguably, a plain reading of the 1940 Act prohibits many
types of derivative transactions by mutual funds. 163 Further, the
guidance that the SEC and its Staff have provided has been sporadic
and sometimes contradictory; 164 the SEC has not issued any formal
guidance since 1979, years before swaps were even invented. 165 As
such, given the importance of these issues to investors, Congress
and/or the SEC should act.
Section A address two foundational issues under the 1940 Act that
are critical to the derivatives discussion: valuation and leverage.
Section B analyzes the complex senior security issues under Section 18
of the 1940 Act and traces the “thirty year patchwork” 166 of SEC and
Staff releases on the subject; offers alternative approaches to resolve
the misalignment between the law and current practice; and proposes
legislative amendments and new regulations consistent with the
doctrinal bases of the 1940 Act. Section C examines issues that arise
under the diversification provisions under the 1940 Act and offers
regulatory solutions. Section D analyzes complex matters with respect
to the 1940 Act’s prohibitions regarding exposure to “securitiesrelated issuers” and sets forth proposed regulations reflecting modern
derivatives practice. Finally, Section E addresses issues with respect to
concentration requirements and proposes regulatory reforms.
A. TWO FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES: VALUATION AND LEVERAGE

1. Different Methods of Valuing Derivatives

Numerous provisions of the 1940 Act require valuation of a fund’s
assets. 167 The determination of the value of an investment company’s
derivatives positions are complex, because the 1940 Act contemplates
“at least two potential measures” of derivative valuation: 168 (1) the
163. See, e.g., supra Part V(B).
164. See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 16; 2009 Donohue Speech, supra note
22, at 6.
165. See supra Part V(B).
166. See, e.g., supra note 160.
167. See generally SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 8–10. It should be noted that the
accounting standards applicable to derivative contracts are extremely complex and beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities,
Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 133 (June 1998); HULL, supra note 1, at 39–
40.
168. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 8–9.
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current market value of the derivative (also referred to as the fair
value), which is generally defined as the liquidation value of the
derivative, 169 and (2) the notional amount, which equals the “contract
size (number of units per contract) multiplied by the current price of
the reference asset on which payment obligations are calculated.” 170
Market value can be a complex notion with respect to certain
derivatives. For example, at the inception of a simple interest rate
swap, the value of the swap is zero; when the applicable interest rate
begins to move, the swap becomes negative to one party and positive
to the other. 171 Further, OTC derivatives have customized terms,
including terms that may restrict transferability or the ability to enter
into offsetting transactions. 172 “Marking-to-market” with respect to a
futures or option contract is accomplished at the end of each trading
session by subtracting any loss (or adding any gain) in the day’s
contract position from (or to) the account balance for the derivative. 173
“Notional amount,” as recognized in the ABA Task Force Report,
“is used differently by different people and in different contexts.” 174
This fact alone underscores the difficulty of even beginning a
meaningful discussion in this area. However, although notional value
is, “a notoriously imperfect measure of the size of the derivatives
market . . . [it] gives at least a weak sense of the magnitude of the risks
169. See discussion in Part V(C)(1) regarding the calculation of market values and fair values.
170. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 8–10; see also, e.g., id. at 9 n. 19 (listing numerous
definitions of “notional amount”). For example, “notional value” has also been defined as “the
value of a derivative’s underlying assets at the spot price.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another useful definition of “notional amount” is that it is “the nominal or face amount that is
used to calculate payments made on a particular instrument, without regard to whether its
obligation under the instrument could be netted against the obligation of another party to pay the
fund under the instrument.” ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 7 n.11; see also, e.g., SEC
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 9 n.19.
171. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 8–9 n.18 (citing Sarah Sharer Curley & Elizabeth
Fella, Where to Hide? How Valuation of Derivatives Haunts the Courts—Even After BAPCPA, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 297, 298–99 (Spring 2009) (explaining that the “value of the swap is the net difference
between the present value of the payments each party expects to receive and the present value of
the payments each party expects to make.”)).
172. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that with respect to some
derivatives, the only pricing information available may be from the fund’s counterparty in the
transaction). In light of these complex considerations, the SEC should issue guidance with respect
to the determination of “fair value.”
173. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 8–9 n.18 (citing CFTC Glossary Mark-to-Market
Definition, CFTC.GOV, available at http://cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTC
Glossary/index.htm).
174. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 7 n.11; see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra
note 1, at 9 n.19; supra note 116 (referencing that the net notional test set forth in the Final CPO
Rules defines notional value by asset class).
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created by derivatives trading and the potential losses to which
derivatives traders might be exposed.” 175
Further complicating matters of valuation is the fact that
derivative transactions typically involve exposures to many variables
that have the potential to affect the value of the instrument. 176 These
variables include counterparty credit risk and a myriad of variables
that could potentially affect the value of the reference asset. 177
Valuation issues are specifically addressed below in Part B(3)(c)
(with respect to Section 18 senior security issues); Part C(1) (with
respect to 1940 Act diversification provisions); Part D(3) (with respect
to exposure to securities-related issuers); and Part E(1) (with respect
to 1940 Act concentration provisions).
2. Various Concepts of Leverage

The SEC has recognized that “[l]everage exists when an investor
achieves the right to a return on a capital base that exceeds the
investment which he has personally contributed to the entity or
instrument achieving a return.” 178
The ABA Task Force Report provides the following description of
the effects of leverage in derivatives:
Market participants are able to acquire exposure (either long
or short) to a large dollar amount of an asset (the notional
value) with only a small down payment, enabling parties to
shift risk more efficiently and with lower costs. The leverage
inherent in these instruments magnifies the effect of changes in
the value of the underlying asset on the initial amount of
capital invested. For example, an initial 5% collateral deposit
on the total value of the commodity would result in 20:1
leverage, with a potential 80% loss (or gain) of the collateral in
response to a 4% movement in the market price of the
underlying commodity. 179
175. Stout, supra note 33, at 23.
176. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 9–10.
177. Id.
178. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25129 n. 5; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 13
n.30.
179. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 8–9; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 13–
14 n.32. For example, if the value of the underlying asset is $100, the collateral deposit would be
$5. A 4% price increase of the reference asset would equal $4, which is 80% of the collateral
deposit of $5.
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“Indebtedness leverage” exists in instruments that “create
obligations, or potential indebtedness, to someone other than the
fund’s shareholders, and enable the fund to participate in gains and
losses on an amount that exceeds the fund’s initial investment.” 180
Additionally, some types of derivatives, including purchased call
options, “provide the economic equivalent of leverage because they
convey the right to a gain or loss on an amount in excess of the fund’s
investment but do not impose a payment obligation on the fund above
its initial investment.” This type of leverage is called “economic
leverage” or “implied leverage.” 181 Derivatives providing economic
leverage “display heightened price sensitivity to market fluctuations . . .
such as changes in stock prices or interest rates . . . [and, in] essence, . . .
magnify a fund’s gain or loss from an investment in much the same
way that incurring indebtedness does.” 182
B.

RESTRICTIONS REGARDING “SENIOR SECURITIES”

As discussed above in Part IV(B), a “core purpose” of the drafters
of the 1940 Act was to protect investors against the dangers of “senior
securities.” This section discusses the fact that the widespread use of
derivatives by investment companies may be misaligned with this
important doctrinal foundation of the 1940 Act, as well as the
provisions of Section 18(f)(1). Although the SEC and SEC Staff have
sporadically spoken on this issue, as referenced above, the guidance
has been sometimes contradictory; as recognized by the SEC Concept
Release, no comprehensive definitive guidance exists. For the reasons
set forth herein, Congress and/or the SEC should decisively speak on
this issue for the protection of investors.
Subsection (1) below discusses Release 10666, the SEC’s “General
Statement of Policy” issued in 1979, which constitutes the sole formal
piece of guidance from the SEC on this matter. Subsection (2)
addresses the “patchwork” 183 of subsequent releases from the SEC Staff
180. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 13 (citing 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 22).
181. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19 n.32 (citing 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 23).
182. Id. (citing 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 23). For example, assume that a fund buys an
option for $1 to call X stock on December 1st at a price of $10. If on December 1st the market
price of X stock is $100, the fund will exercise its call option and purchase the stock for $10. For
an initial outlay of $1, the fund obtains a right to a profit of $89. Similarly, if today’s market price
for X stock is $10, and the fund buys one share using $1 of its own and $9 borrowed from a bank,
when the price of X stock hits $100, the fund will have a profit of $90 for its initial outlay of $1
(less borrowing costs).
183. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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regarding various types of instruments. Subsection (3) examines
possible alternative approaches to the treatment of derivatives under
Section 18 of the 1940 Act. Finally, Subsection (4) proposes specific
legislative and regulatory solutions.
1. The SEC’s 1979 “General Statement of Policy”

The SEC first framed the issue in 1979 with its “General Statement
of Policy” in Release 10666. 184 Specifically, in Release 10666, the SEC
considered the applicability of the 1940 Act’s senior security
limitations with respect to the following three types of agreements:
reverse repurchase agreements, 185 firm commitment agreements, 186
and standby commitment agreements. 187 The Commission found that
while such agreements may not be “securities” for all purposes, 188 they
“‘fall within the functional meaning of the term “evidence of
indebtedness” for purposes of Section 18 of the Act,’ which generally
would include ‘all contractual obligations to pay in the future for
184. See supra note 135. This release is referred to in the industry as “ten-triple-six.” 2009
Donohue Speech, supra note 23, at 1.
185. In a typical reverse repurchase agreement, a fund that owns a debt security transfers
possession of such security to a broker-dealer or a bank in return for proceeds constituting a
percentage of the market value of such debt security; however, the fund retains record ownership
of the debt security, as well as the right to receive interest and principal payments. See, e.g.,
Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25130 n. 10; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 20 n.56.
186. In a typical firm commitment agreement (also referred to as a “when-issued security” or a
“forward contract”), a fund agrees to purchase a debt security from a seller, typically a brokerdealer, at a specified future date, price and yield. See, e.g., Release 10666, supra note 135, at
25130; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 20 n. 56; see also, e.g., supra note 43.
187. In a standby commitment agreement, a fund effectively writes a put agreement, giving the
counterparty the option to require the fund to purchase a debt security at a specified date, price
and yield. See, e.g., Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25130; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1,
at 20 n. 56; see also, e.g., supra note 35.
188. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 20. Given the “policies and purposes” of the 1940
Act, the definition of “security” contained therein in section 2(a)(36) (and the SEC’s interpretation
of same) is broader than the definition contained in other securities laws. SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 20 n.57. For example, the 1940 Act’s definition of “security” includes any
“evidence of indebtedness,” whereas the 1934 Act’s definition in section 3(a)(10) does not. See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2006 & Supp. 2010). It should be noted that the ABA Task Force Report
interprets Section 2(a)(36)’s specific reference to security futures to mean that “[o]ther futures
contracts are not securities under the 1940 Act.” ABA Task Force Report, supra note 13, at n.42.
However, this analysis fails to consider the “evidence of indebtedness” prong of the definition.
See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at n.134 (stating that “[a]s a general matter, most
derivatives appear to be notes or evidence of indebtedness and thus securities for purposes of the
diversification requirements”).
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consideration presently received.’” 189
As such, the Commission
acknowledged that such agreements “may” constitute senior securities,
which are prohibited under Section 18(f)(1). 190 The SEC noted that
“[t]he gains and losses from the transactions can be extremely large
relative to invested capital; for this reason, each agreement has
speculative aspects.” 191 Further, the SEC stated that its view that such
agreements could be senior securities was “based not so much on the
conclusion that reverse repurchase agreements and firm commitment
agreements, considered in isolation, are inherently securities for all
purposes, but more upon the proposition that trading practices
involving the use by investment companies of such agreements for
speculative purposes or to accomplish leveraging fall within the
legislative purposes of Section 18.” 192
Leverage exists when an investor achieves the right to a return
on a capital base that exceeds the investment which he has
personally contributed to the entity or instrument achieving a
return . . . . Through a reverse repurchase agreement, an
investment company can achieve a return on a very large
capital base relative to its cash contribution. Therefore, the
reverse repurchase agreement is a highly leveraged
transaction. 193
“[B]ecause of the additional risk of loss created by the substantial
leveraging in each agreement, and in light of the volatility of interest
rates in the marketplace,” each of the instruments addressed by
Release 10666 potentially constituted “a substantially higher risk
environment.” 194 In fact, for investments that require no up-front
investment, such as the firm commitment, “unlimited leverage” is
created. 195
189. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 20–21 (emphasis added) (quoting Release 10666,
supra note 135, at 25131–32).
190. See supra note 189.
191. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 21–22
n. 62.
192. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32 (emphasis added); SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 21. “Leveraging of a fund’s portfolio through the issuance of senior securities
‘magnifies the potential for gain or loss on monies invested, and therefore, results in an increase
in the speculative character of the investment company’s outstanding securities.’” SEC Concept
Release, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25129).
193. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25129 n. 5;” SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 21.
194. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25129 n. 5; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 21.
195. Release 10666, supra note 135 at 25130 (explaining that “[i]f the investor puts up
nothing, leverage cannot be measured in ratio terms, and therefore can be said to be unlimited or
infinite”).
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Although Release 10666 found that the agreements addressed
were “functionally equivalent to senior securities,” it held that “these
and similar arrangements nonetheless could be used by funds in a
manner that would not warrant application of the section 18
restrictions.” 196 Specifically, the SEC found that if an investment
company using such agreements set up segregated accounts, that were
“properly created and maintained,” such segregated accounts “would
limit the investment company’s risk of loss.” 197 The Commission stated
that such segregated accounts should be established with the fund’s
custodian and contain liquid assets (including “cash, U.S. government
securities, or other appropriate high-grade debt obligations”) equal in
amount to the indebtedness created by the senior security. 198 The
liquid assets contained in the segregated account would be “deemed
frozen and unavailable for sale or other disposition” and would be
marked-to-market daily, with additional assets added when necessary
to maintain the required amount in the account. 199
The SEC noted that a properly maintained segregated account
would function as “a practical limit on the amount of leverage which
the investment company may undertake and on the potential increase
in the speculative character of its outstanding common stock” and that
it would also serve to “assure the availability of adequate funds to meet
the obligations arising from such activities.” 200
The amount of assets required to be maintained in each
segregated account would differ for each such agreement, depending
on the amount of indebtedness created with respect thereto. For
example, the amount required to be segregated under a reverse
repurchase agreement that specified a repurchase price would be the
For both firm and standby commitment
repurchase price. 201
agreements, the segregated amount would be equal to the specified
purchase price to be paid for the underlying security at issue. 202 Thus,
the SEC adopted the notional amount as the proper amount to be
segregated for these instruments. 203
196. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22.
197. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22.
198. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22.
199. Id.; Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32. This method is hereinafter referred to
as the “Segregated Account Approach.”
200. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32; see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 1,
at 22–23.
201. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22–23; Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–
32.
202. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22–23; Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–
32.
203. See supra Part V(A)(1).
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The SEC asserted an important caution in Release 10666 that “as
the percentage of a fund’s portfolio assets that are segregated assets
increases, the fund’s ability to meet current obligations, to honor
requests for redemption, and to manage properly the investment
portfolio in a manner consistent with its stated investment objective may
become impaired.” 204
For example, in an extreme case, an investment company
which [sic] has segregated all of its liquid assets might be
forced to sell non-segregated portfolio securities to meet its
obligations upon shareholder requests for redemption. Such
forced sales could cause an investment company to sell
securities which [sic] it wanted to retain or to realize gains or
losses which it did not originally intend. Therefore, directors
should consider such potential loss of flexibility when
determining the extent to which the investment company
should engage in such transactions. 205
Because of the dearth of information available regarding mutual
fund derivative transactions, it is uncertain at this point whether
mutual fund investors are adequately protected in this regard.
It should be noted that Release 10666 departs from a previous
analysis by the SEC Staff (“Staff”) in 1972. 206 Consistent with Release
10666, the 1972 Staff Release found that “[a]lthough commodities and
commodity futures contracts themselves may not be securities, the
purchase of a commodities futures contract and the ensuring [sic]
leverage may involve the creation of a senior security.” 207 Nonetheless,
the Staff stated that it would not object if an investment company
traded in commodities futures contracts with the imposition of the
following limitations: (a) a 300% asset coverage requirement
applicable to bank borrowings, (b) an asset segregation requirement
applicable to the original margin deposited with respect to each
contract, and (3) exposure limitations restricting investment in any
commodity contract to no more than twice the original margin and

204. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 22 n.65 (emphasis added); see also Release 10666,
supra note 135, at 25131–32.
205. Release 10666, supra note 135, at 25131–32.
206. See Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, Investment Company Act Release No.
7221 (June 9, 1972) [hereinafter the 1972 Staff Release]. As discussed in notes 206–07, infra,
releases by the Staff are not binding on the Commission.
207. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 11–12 n.15 (quoting the 1972 Staff Release,
supra note 204).
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restricting total commodities contract investments to 10% of its
assets. 208
In contrast, Release 10666 required a 100 percent asset
segregation requirement, but made no mention of the 300 percent
asset coverage requirement or an exposure limitation. Unfortunately,
the SEC in Release 10666 did not set forth any analysis regarding the
1972 Staff Release or its decision to depart from the multi-pronged
limitations set forth therein.
The SEC has not issued any formal guidance regarding derivatives
transactions by mutual funds since Release 10666 was issued in 1979.
2. SEC Staff No-Action Letters Regarding the Segregated Account
Approach

Since 1979, the Staff has issued over twenty no-action letters 209
to investment companies regarding the Segregated Account Approach
with respect to various types of senior securities, including stock index
futures, interest rate futures, currency forwards and associated
options. 210 It should be noted that, although the SEC Concept Release
discusses certain no-action letters in its analysis, it states clearly that
its “discussion of staff statements is provided solely for background
and to facilitate comment on issues that the Commission might
address” and that such “discussion is in no way intended to suggest
that the Commission has adopted the analysis, conclusions or any
other portion of the staff statements” discussed. 211
In 1987, the Staff issued a no-action letter to two Dreyfus
funds 212 expanding on the ways that obligations could be “covered” by

208. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 12 n.15 (citing the 1972 Staff Release, supra
note 204).
209. SEC Staff no-action letters are issued by the Staff in response to written requests for
advice regarding how the federal securities laws apply with respect to certain transactions. SEC
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23 n. 68. As such, they are not binding as to how the
Commission would actually address a given situation. Id.; see also, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION 32 (4th ed., 2011). In contrast to non-precedential Staff
releases, Release 10666 was issued by the Commission as a “General Statement of Policy” of the
SEC.
210. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23 n. 69 and accompanying text. For a complete list
of these no-action letters, see Registered Investment Company Use of Senior Securities—Select
Bibliography, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n Staff, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
investment /seniorsecurities-bibiliogaphy.htm.
211. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23 n.68.
212. Dreyfus Strategic Investing and Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC Staff No-Action Letter
(June 22, 1987) [hereinafter the Dreyfus No-Action Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm.
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funds with respect to futures, forwards, short sales and written
options. 213 With respect to long positions in futures 214 and forwards 215
and written put options, 216 the Staff stated that the funds could avoid
senior security treatment by establishing a segregated account
containing certain liquid assets equal to the purchase price of the
contract or the strike price of the put (minus any margin amounts that
had been deposited). 217 As for short positions in futures 218 and forward
contracts, 219 written call options, 220 and short sales of securities, 221 the
Staff stated that the funds could avoid senior security treatment by
establishing a segregated account with certain liquid assets in an
amount that, when added to any margin amounts deposited with a
broker or futures commission merchant, would total the market value
of the assets underlying the futures, forwards, call options and short
sales (but would not be less than the strike price of the call or the
market price at which the short positions were established). 222
The Dreyfus No-Action Letter also stated that, instead of
segregating liquid assets to avoid senior security treatment, the funds
could also “cover” by “owning, or holding the right to obtain, the
instrument or cash that the fund has obligated itself to deliver.” 223 The
213. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 23–24.
214. For a description of a long futures position, see supra notes 34–35.
215. For a description of a long forward position, see supra note 43.
216. For a description of a written put option, see supra note 35.
217. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 24 (summarizing the Dreyfus No-Action Letter).
218. For a description of a short futures position, see supra notes 34–35.
219. For a description of a short forward position, see supra note 43.
220. For a description of a written call option, see supra note 35.
221. A short sale occurs when, believing that the price of a certain stock will fall, an investor
borrows stock and sells it; if the price decreases, the investor will buy the stock at the decreased
price and make a profit, but if the price increases, the investor will incur a loss when buying it at
the increased price. See, e.g., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Investor Glossary, INVESTOR.GOV (site last
visited July 25, 2012) http://investor.gov/glossary/glossary_terms/short-sale, [hereinafter the
SEC Investor Glossary]; see also, e.g., Georgia Bullitt, Thomas Harman, Christopher Menconi, Bill
Zimmerman & Christopher Jackson, Legal Considerations for Registered Investment Companies
Investing in Derivatives: Part 1, 17 THE INVESTMENT LAWYER 12, at 14 (2010) (discussing issues
faced by registered investment companies transacting in short sales with respect to marginrelated rules under Regulation T of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; New
York Stock Exchange Rule 431; and Rule 2520 of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).
222. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 24 (summarizing the Dreyfus No-Action Letter).
However, as noted in the SEC Concept Release, a subsequent no-action letter stated that the Staff
would not recommend enforcement action where, with respect to a short position in a security,
the amount segregated was equal to the daily market price of the security sold short (less
collateral amounts pledged to a broker), even if such amount was less than the price establishing
the short position. Id. at 24 n.71 (citing Robertson Stephens Investment Trust, SEC Staff NoAction Letter (Aug. 24, 1995), available at www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/seniorsecuritiesbibliography.htm).
223. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 24 (summarizing the Dreyfus No-Action Letter).
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Staff explained that a fund holding a long position in a futures or
forward contract could cover by buying a put option on the same
contract with a strike price no less than price of the long contract. 224
With respect to a written put option, a fund could cover by (1) selling
short the assets underlying the put at a price no less than the strike
price of the put or (2) purchase a put with a strike price equal to or
greater than the strike price of the fund’s written put option.225
Importantly, the Dreyfus No-Action Letter confirmed that, if a fund met
the foregoing asset segregation or cover requirements, the 300 percent
asset coverage requirement of Section 18(f) would not apply.
The 1994 Report, a Staff study by the Division of Investment
Management, was written in response to a congressional
subcommittee request at the wake of the drastic decline of the
collateralized mortgage obligation (“CMO”) market, which “resulted in
the liquidation of hundreds of millions of dollars of CMO derivatives,
further depressing the market and negatively impacting funds that had
invested in them.” 226 The 1994 Report concluded that although
“several funds had recently experienced significant losses from
investments in mortgage derivatives,” in general, the use of derivatives
by investment companies was “limited.” 227 The 1994 Report concluded
that the use of derivatives by investment companies should not be
prohibited or restricted for three reasons:
First, a prohibition or restriction on derivatives use could chill
the use of instruments in a manner that is beneficial for mutual
funds, such has hedging. Second, a prohibition or restriction on
derivatives use would be inconsistent with the general
approach of the Investment Company Act, which imposes few
substantive limits on mutual fund investments.
Funds
generally are permitted to make investments without regard to
their volatility, e.g., emerging market securities and small
company stocks, and we are not persuaded that derivatives
should be treated differently. Third, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to devise appropriate prohibitions
or restrictions on the use of derivatives by mutual funds
because of the wide variety of instruments that may be
considered “derivatives.” The available “derivatives” are likely
to change as innovation occurs in the marketplace, possibly
224.
225.
226.
227.

SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 24–25.
Id.
See 2009 Donohue Speech, supra note 23.
Id. (emphasis added) (summarizing the 1994 Report).
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rendering substantive prohibitions or restrictions ineffective
within a short time. 228
The 1994 Report concluded that “one of the most effective means
for addressing leverage concerns associated with mutual fund use of
derivatives is improved risk disclosure.” 229
Thereafter, in a 1996 no action letter to Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, 230 the Staff expanded upon the description in Release
10666 of the types of assets that could be segregated to avoid Section
18’s senior security limitations. 231 While Release 10666 stated that
appropriate liquid assets for segregation included “cash, U.S.
government securities, or other appropriate high-grade debt
obligations,” 232 the Staff in the Merrill No-Action Letter took the view
that “any liquid asset, including equity securities and non-investment
grade debt securities” 233 would constitute sufficient cover. 234 In
defending this position, the Staff explained that this revised approach
would still “place a practical limit on the amount of leverage that a
fund may undertake and on the potential increase in the speculative
character of its outstanding shares.” 235
In 1997, the Staff once again extended Release 10666 by stating
that a fund could segregate liquid assets merely by making the
designation in its books and that there was no need to establish a
segregated account with the fund’s custodian in accordance with the
custody provisions of the 1940 Act. 236
228. See 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 24–25 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., 2009
Donohue Speech, supra note 23.
229. 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 25; see also, e.g., 2009 Donohue Speech, supra note 23.
Although the Commission issued a concept release shortly after the 1994 Report seeking
comments regarding the improvement of mutual fund disclosure, it has not taken any action to
date with respect to mutual fund risk disclosure regarding derivative use. See, e.g., 2009 Donohue
Speech, supra. However, the Staff did issue a letter to the Investment Company Institute in 2010
regarding such issues. Derivatives-Related Disclosures by Investment Companies, Letter from Barry
D. Miller, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Karrie McMillan, Gen.
Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst. (July 30, 2010)(the “2010 Staff Disclosure Letter”), available at
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/ici073010.pdf. It is recommended that such
guidance be formalized by action from the Commission, with the inclusion of additional
disclosure recommendations made throughout this paper.
230. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, L.P., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (July 2, 1996), available
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm [hereinafter the
Merrill No-Action Letter].
231. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19, 25.
232. Id.
233. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 19, 25.
234. Id.
235. Id. (interpreting the Merrill No-Action Letter).
236. Id. at 25–26 (citing “Dear Chief Financial Officer Lette from Lawrence A. Friend, Chief
Accountant, Div of Inv. Mgmt. (Nov. 7, 1997) [hereinafter the 1997 Friend Letter], available at
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The SEC Concept Release concluded its discussion of post-1979
Staff releases regarding Section 18 issues by stating:
Asset segregation practices with respect to other derivatives
investments have not been addressed by the Commission, or by
the staff in no-action letters. Certain swaps, for example, that
settle in cash on a net basis, appear to be treated by many
funds as requiring segregation of an amount of assets equal to
the fund’s daily mark-to-market liability, if any. Similarly, some
funds have disclosed that they segregate only their daily, markto-market liability, if any, with respect to futures and forward
contracts that are contractually required to cash-settle. 237
The SEC Concept Release summarizes that the Staff has generally
taken the position that, with respect to long positions, the amount to be
segregated should be the purchase or exercise price of the relevant
contract (deducting any deposited margin amounts); whereas, with
respect to short positions, the amount to be segregated should be the
market value of the underlying asset “measured by the full amount of
the reference asset, i.e., the notional amount of the transaction rather
than the unrealized gain or loss on the transaction, i.e., its current
mark-to-market value.” 238 However, the ABA Task Force Report notes
that the Staff has informally acquiesced (1) “to the segregation of the
net amount due under an interest rate swap that required, by its terms,
the netting of the payments that each party was required to make
under the swap” 239 and (2) “to the segregation of the net amount due”
on cash-settled futures and forwards. 240 The ABA Task Force Report
concludes:
[E]xisting formal and informal guidance is not theoretically
consistent. In the case of certain instruments, funds apparently
are expected to segregate assets that are equivalent in value to
the notional value of the instrument; in other cases, however, it
is sufficient to segregate only an amount equal to the daily
marked-to-market value of the obligation. 241
Further, as noted by the 1994 Report, “[t]he Commission and

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm.
237. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 26 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); but see
infra text accompanying notes 235–37. For a discussion of the asset segregation treatment of
cash-settled futures and forwards, see ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 14–15.
238. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 26–27 (citing Release 10666, supra note 137, at
25131–32).
239. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 13–14 (noting that, to the task force’s
knowledge, “the SEC staff has neither publicly confirmed that position in writing, nor addressed
the segregation requirements that apply to other kinds of swaps”).
240. Id. at 13.
241. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 16.
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the . . . [S]taff have not applied section 18 of the . . . [1940 Act] to
derivatives that create economic leverage, such as purchased stock call
options and leveraged inverse floating rate bonds.” 242
The following Subsection addresses possible resolutions of this
complex matter.

3. Possible Alternative Approaches To the Treatment of Derivatives
Under Section 18 of the 1940 Act

As there is no comprehensive guidance from the SEC regarding
these very complicated and nuanced senior security issues, especially
given that the framers of the 1940 Act considered the protection of
investors from the dangers of senior securities to be a “core issue” of
the statute, 243 Congress and/or the SEC should promptly institute
reforms. Following is a discussion of various alternative approaches to
the treatment of derivatives under Section 18. 244 For further
discussion regarding suggested legislative and regulatory solutions,
see Subsection 4 below.
a. The Strictest Approach: A Prohibition of Mutual Fund Derivatives
Transactions Evidencing Indebtedness

Under a plain reading of Section 18(f)(1), mutual funds are
prohibited from issuing senior securities, with certain limited
exceptions, including bank borrowings, which require 300% asset
coverage. 245 Thus, if the SEC was correct in its analysis in Release
10666 that certain derivative transactions “may” constitute the
issuance of senior securities (and if that were indeed the case), then
such transactions would be prohibited under a plain reading of Section
18(f)(1). The SEC recognized this fact in its analysis. 246 However, if
such a prohibition were enforced, investors would lose the positive
benefits of such derivatives, such as for bona fide hedging purposes.
242. 1994 Report, supra note 91, at 24.
243. See supra Part IV(B).
244. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 26–48.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(d), (f)(1), (f)(2) and (g) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§270.18f-1, 270.18f-2 and
270.18f-3. It should be noted that Section 12(a) of the 1940 Act also prohibits mutual funds from
purchasing securities on margin or short selling securities “in contravention of such rules and
regulations or orders as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. §80a-12(a)(2006).
246. See supra Part V(B)(1); see also, SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 42.
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That being said, the question arises regarding whether the SEC
acted outside the scope of its authority in issuing Release 10666 (and
whether the Staff has overstepped its bounds in penning the release’s
progeny). Section 6(c) of the 1940 Act provides:
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own
motion, or by order upon application, may conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or
any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from
any provision or provisions of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended
by the policy and provisions of this title. 247
Thus, to exempt senior securities issued by mutual funds from the
prohibition contained in Section 18(f)(1), the SEC would need to find
that the exemption from prohibition was (1) necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, (2) consistent with the protection of investors,
and (3) consistent with “the purposes fairly intended by the policy and
provisions” of the 1940 Act. It is not apparent from a reading of
Release 10666 that the SEC ever undertook this analysis, perhaps
because the release does not set forth concrete findings of, and
exemptions from, senior security status, but rather issues a statement
of policy. In any event, even if the SEC undertook such an analysis in
1979 when Release 10666 was issued, the explosive growth of mutual
funds and derivatives trading since that time would basically render
such original analysis largely moot. In 1979, total mutual fund net
assets were $94.5 billion; at year-end 2011, net assets totaled $11.6
trillion. 248 In 1979, swaps had not even been invented; 249 as of year-end
2011, the notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives transactions
was $647.8 trillion. 250
Obviously, this is not an issue that the mutual fund industry will
be asserting. And the easiest course for the grossly understaffed SEC,
overwhelmed with rulemaking efforts to effectuate the Dodd-Frank
247. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(C) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 2(c) further provides:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is consistent with the public
interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006). See also supra note 245 (discussing Commission rules, regulations
and orders under Section 12(a)).
248. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 132.
249. See supra note 13.
250. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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Act, is to defer the issue. However, the issue is an important one for
individual mutual fund investors, 94% of whom are counting on their
mutual fund investments to finance their retirements. 251 For the
foregoing reasons, given the importance of the topic, it would be best
for Congress to address the issue. However, such action by Congress
will most likely not happen in the near term, if the political efforts to
repeal the Dodd-Frank Act and to cut critical agency budgets are any
indication of general attitudes towards financial reform efforts. 252
Therefore, the SEC must act.
b. A More Realistic Approach: Imposition of Derivative Transaction
Restrictions Drawn from the 1972 Staff Release

Given the enormous size of the mutual fund industry and its
widespread use of derivatives, a more realistic approach would be for
the SEC to allow derivatives transactions evidencing indebtedness by
mutual funds, but to impose limitations drawn from the 1972 Staff
Release. 253 Of course, if the SEC were to formally find that derivatives
transactions evidencing indebtedness were senior securities, then any
exemption from the plain text of the statute would require the Section
6(c) analysis discussed in Part V(B)(3)(a).
As explained above, with respect to commodities futures
contracts, the 1972 Staff Release imposed (1) the 300% asset coverage
requirement applicable to bank borrowings, (2) plus an asset
segregation requirement applicable to the original margin deposited
with respect to each contract, (3) plus exposure limitations restricting
investment in any commodity contract to no more than twice the
original margin and restricting total commodities contract investments
to 10% of a fund’s assets. 254 Of course, the foregoing limitations would
have to be tailored to the reality of today’s market after a thorough
analysis. 255 However, in theory, this three-pronged approach would
251. See supra text accompanying note 21.
252. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republicans Laying Blame,
NYTIMES.COM (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/business/dodd-frank-actis-a-target-on-gop-campaign-trail.html?pagewanted=all; Editorial, Lost the Vote? Deny the Money,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2012), at SR10.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 203–04.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 243–46. Note that this approach would impose
features of the regulatory segregated assets approach (discussed in Subsection (c) below) and the
global exposure limitation approach (discussed in Subsection (e) below).
255. Additionally, under any of the proposed solutions detailed in this Subsection, the issues of
valuation and leverage specifically addressed in Part V(B)(3)(c) would be implicated.
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certainly be more in line with the doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act
discussed in Part IV(B) than the current “patchwork” approach to the
matter.
An approach based on the 1972 Staff Release could draw a
distinction between hedging and speculative derivatives trading by
investment companies. 256 This approach was taken by the CFTC in
crafting the Rule 4.5 de minimus exception discussed above. 257
However, as previously noted, crafting and enforcing a definition of
bona fide hedging activity has proven to be an immense task for
regulators, fraught with strong resistance from the industry. 258
The foregoing tiered approach to leverage limitations would more
closely address the doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act, highlighted
in Part IV(B), than the SEC’s present course.
c. A Comprehensive Version of the Current “Patchwork” Approach:
Definitive Regulatory Segregated Account Regulations

A third approach would involve the SEC issuing a comprehensive
policy elaborating on its current Segregation Account Approach. 259
Industry criticism regarding this approach has been centered on the
fact that, because it is premised on “an instrument-by-instrument
assessment of the amount of cover required,” the treatment of new
products will be uncertain. 260 Further, some have argued that this
approach has resulted in “differing treatment of arguably equivalent
products.” 261
These criticisms aside, a policy utilizing this approach must
specify whether the segregation standard would be the notional
amount or the mark-to-market amount. 262 Industry participants have
With respect to
made arguments against both approaches. 263
segregation of notional amounts, some have argued that such amounts
may often exceed the maximum risk of loss on the contract, resulting in
256. See supra text accompanying notes 74–79.
257. See supra Part III(B).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 74–79, 83, 120–23.
259. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 26–29.
260. Id. at 27.
261. Id. For example, some have argued that a physically settled future (requiring segregation
of the amount of the delivery obligation) and a cash-settled future (treated by some funds as
requiring segregation of only the typically smaller mark-to-market obligation) are equivalent
products, but that they are treated differently. Id. at 27 n.79.
262. See supra Part V(A)(1).
263. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 27–28.
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unnecessary limitations of the use of derivative strategies that could be
of potential benefit to investors. 264 However, jurisdictions across the
globe that have enacted limitations on fund leverage exposure have
commonly relied on the notional approach “as a conservative measure
of the exposure created by derivatives.” 265 As for the segregation of
daily mark-to-market liabilities, such amounts may be inadequate to
compensate for potential future losses sustained with regard to such
derivative transactions in contravention of the purposes of section
18. 266
To illustrate the “significant disparity” between the notional and
mark-to-market approaches, the SEC Concept Release points to the
previously referenced study of credit default swap (“CDS”)
transactions by the largest one hundred U.S. corporate bond funds
from 2004 through 2008. 267 The study found that, with respect to the
65 funds transacting in CDS transactions during the relevant time
period, the total notional amount of such positions ballooned from a
fund average of $103 million in 2004 to a fund average of $632 million
in 2008. 268 Further, “[t]he mean total notional amount of a fund’s CDS
positions relative to its net asset value (“NAV”) increased from 2% to
almost 14%.” 269 Strikingly, the notional amounts of CDS positions held
by three funds in 2008 actually exceeded such funds’ NAVs. 270 In stark
contrast to these notional statistics, the average unrealized CDS “book”
losses of a fund were less than 1% of NAV. 271
An alternative to the notional and mark-to-market approaches
would require segregation of an amount equal to the amount that a
fund is at risk of losing in the transaction, measured by a complex
model such as the “Value at Risk” (“VaR”) model. 272 VaR models have
come under increasing scrutiny since J.P. Morgan’s recent derivatives
264. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 27–28.
265. See, SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 31.
266. Id. at 27–28. As the ABA Task Force Report noted: “[A] fund’s exposure under a derivative
contract could increase significantly on an intraday basis, resulting in the segregated assets [of
only the daily mark-to-market liability amount] being worth less than the fund’s obligations (until
the fund is able to place additional assets in the segregated account . . . .) To the extent that a fund
relying on the . . . [Merrill No-Action Letter] segregates assets whose prices are somewhat volatile,
this ‘shortfall’ could be magnified.”
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 16 (emphasis added); see also SEC Concept Release,
supra note 1, at 28 n.83.
267. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 28–29 (citing Adam & Guettler, supra note 91); see
supra discussion at text accompanying notes 98-107.
268. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 12).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 12).
272. See, e.g., id. at 29. For a discussion of VaR, see infra note 282.
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loss of approximately $6 to $8 billion dollars, which J.P Morgan has
blamed, in part, on a faulty VaR model. 273 In addition to concerns
regarding unreliability, such an approach would also be extremely
difficult to regulate, especially if regulators were to rely on each fund’s
unique VaR model. 274
Also as discussed above, issues regarding the types of assets to be
segregated (i.e., “liquid assets” as defined by Release 10666, 275 or by
the more expansive Merrill No-Action Letter definition276) and the
manner in which such assets are to be segregated (i.e., with the fund’s
custodian as specified by Release 10666 277 or merely as a book entry as
discussed in the 1997 Friend Letter 278) must be clearly addressed.

d. The ABA Task Force Report’s Proposed Approach: Fund-Generated
Segregated Account Policies

The ABA Task Force Report “considers comprehensive guidance
[with respect to the Asset Segregation Approach] unlikely to be
achievable, given that any generalized approach . . . [would] likely fail
to take into account significant variations in individual transactions.” 279
As such, the ABA Task Force Report recommends an asset segregation
approach in which each fund would create its own asset segregation
policies for derivatives that involve leverage as defined by Release
10666. In developing such standards, fund advisers “could take into
account a variety of risk measures, including . . . [VaR models] 280 and
other quantitative measures of portfolio risk, and would not be limited
to the notional amount or mark-to-market standards.” 281 Although
273. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Gregory Zuckerman, Losses on ‘Whale’ Tab Hits $5.8 Billion,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2012, at B1, B2; David Reilly, Did J.P. Morgan Fiddle While Risk Burned, WALL
ST. J., May 21, 2012, at C8; Julie Steinberg & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Models Get Regulatory
Spotlight, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2012, at A13.
274. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 273 (quoting former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair explaining that
banks have an “incentive to game their model to lower their regulatory capital requirement).
275. See supra text accompanying note 196.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 231–32.
277. See supra text accompanying note 196.
278. See supra text accompanying note 234.
279. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 30.
280. VaR is a “[p]rocedure for estimating the probability of portfolio losses exceeding some
specified proportion based on a statistical analysis of historical market price trends, correlations,
and volatilities.” NASDAQ Investor Glossary, NASDAQ.COM (last visited July 25, 2012),
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/v/value-at-risk-model. As noted above, VaR has
come under intense scrutiny following J.P. Morgan’s recent derivatives debacle resulting in a loss
of over $6 billion. See, e.g., supra notes 274–75.
281. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 30.
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such policies would be approved by the mutual fund board and
disclosed in fund literature, placing such broad powers in the hands of
investment advisers, who are compensated based on the amount of
fund assets, and thus, may be incentivized to increase fund risk, 282
would undermine the senior security provisions of the 1940 Act. 283 As
noted above, such protections were considered by the framers of the
1940 Act to be a “core purpose” of the statute. 284 For these reasons, the
ABA Task Force Report’s proposed approach, despite its practical
feasibility, should be rejected.
e. The European Approach: “Global Exposure” Limitations

Another approach to regulating funds’ use of derivatives leverage
is the approach taken by the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (“CESR”), which became the European Securities and
Markets Authority on January 1, 2011. After conducting an “extensive
review . . . [of] exposure measures for derivatives” 285 utilized by
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
(“UCITS”), which are “investment vehicles authorized for sale to retail
investors,” 286 CESR’s Guidelines on Risk Measurement and the
Calculation of Global Exposure and Counterparty Risk for UCITS
(hereinafter, the “CESR Guidelines for UCITS”) was issued in 2010. 287
The CESR Guidelines for UCITS implemented the European
282. See Adam & Guettler, supra note 91, at 5–6 (discussing the mutual fund “tournament”
theory and noting that underperforming bond funds are incentivized to increase risk to boost
returns, often utilizing credit default swap positions).
283. See, e.g, 2009 Donohue Speech, supra note 23 (stating that “[o]ne of my recurring
concerns has been investment companies’ use of derivatives and what I perceive as the increasing
gap between how the . . . [1940 Act] and investors look at fund portfolios versus how investment
advisers look at them”).
284. See supra Part IV(B). Overarching the senior security protections of the 1940 Act is the
notion that the entire statute was enacted to protect investors from the inherent conflict between
the adviser/shareholder relationship. See, e.g., supra Part IV(A).
285. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 31.
286. Id.
287. CESR’s Guidelines on Risk Measurement and the Calculation of Global Exposure and
Counterparty Risk for UCITS, Committee of European Securities Regulators (July 28, 2010)
[hereinafter the CESR Guidelines for UCITS], available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/popup2.
php?id=7000. For the CESR Guidelines for UCITS to be effective in a European Union Member
State, such Member State must expressly adopt them. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at n. 92.
The SEC Concept Release notes that, to date, a “few EU Member States, e.g., Ireland and
Luxembourg” have adopted the CESR Guidelines for UCITS. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at
n. 92.
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Commission’s 2009 directive 288 permitting UCITS to engage in
derivatives transactions “subject to a ‘global exposure’ limitation,
under which the derivatives exposure of a UCITS may not exceed the
total net value of the UCITS’ portfolio.” 289 As further set forth below,
the CESR Guidelines for UCITS “extensively address the calculation of
derivatives exposure under the ‘global exposure’ limit” and set forth
two alternative calculation methods: (1) the “commitment approach”
and (2) the “advanced risk measurement method.” 290
Under the commitment approach, global exposure is calculated by
reference to a detailed schedule setting forth various types of
derivatives and specific conversion methods to be applied to calculate
global exposure. 291 Typically, the market value of the underlying
reference asset is utilized (in other words, the “notional amount,” as
defined above 292), but this may be “replaced by the notional value or
the price of the futures contract where this is more conservative.” 293
For example, for plain vanilla interest rate swaps, the applicable
conversion method is the reference asset’s market value; however,
with respect to the portion of the swap requiring payment of a fixed
rate, the notional value may also be utilized. 294 The applicable
conversion method for foreign exchange forwards is the notional value
of the applicable currency. 295 With respect to bond futures, the number
of contracts is “multiplied by the notional contract size multiplied by
the market price of the cheapest-to-deliver bond.” 296 Finally, for “nonstandard derivatives, where it is not possible to convert the derivative
into the market value or notional value of the equivalent underlying
asset, the . . . [schedule notes] that ‘an alternative approach may be
used provided that the total amount of the derivatives represent a
negligible portion of the UCITS portfolio.’” 297 The CESR Guidelines for
288. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on
the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions Relating To Undertakings
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities [hereinafter the 2009 EC Directive], available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OH:L:2009:302:0032:0096:en:PDF.
289. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 31–32 (citing the 2009 EC Directive, Article 51(3),
at 62); see also, e.g., Karrie McMillan, The Regulation of Derivatives: Under UCITS and the
Investment Company Act, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE 2012, PLI ORDER NO. 34297 (Practicing Law Institute, ed., Feb. 9-10, 2012).
290. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 32.
291. Id. at 32 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 291, at 7–12).
292. See supra Part V(A)(1).
293. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 32 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra
note 291, at 7).
294. Id. at 32 n.98 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 8).
295. Id. (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 9).
296. Id. at 32 n.98 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 8).
297. Id. at 32 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 7).
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UCITS state that the “commitment approach should not be applied to
UCITS using, to a large extent and in a systemic way, financial
derivative instruments as part of complex investment strategies.” 298
The advanced risk measurement method utilizes VaR, or a similar
risk measurement method, to attempt “to measure the maximum
potential loss due to market risk rather than leverage.” 299 “[T]he VaR
approach measures the maximum potential loss at a given confidence
level (probability) over a specific time period under normal market
conditions.” 300 Importantly, using all of a UCITS’ portfolio, “[t]he VaR
approach measures the probability of risk of loss rather than the
amount of leverage in portfolio.” 301 The CESR Guidelines for UCITS
specify that either an “absolute VaR approach” or a “relative VaR
approach” may be utilized. 302 Under the “absolute VaR approach, “[t]he
absolute VaR of a UCITS cannot be greater than 20% of its NAV.” 303
When using the “relative VaR approach,” the VaR of the fund’s portfolio
must be equal to or less than twice the VaR of a reference portfolio that
is unleveraged. 304
It should be noted that, on top of the global exposure limitation of
the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, “cover rules” for derivative investments
are also imposed. 305 These cover rules require that UCITS ensure that
they can meet all of their delivery and payment obligations with
respect to their derivative transactions. 306
Other jurisdictions have adopted similar approaches to those set
forth in the CESR Guidelines for UCITS. For example, the Central Bank
of Ireland’s guidelines with respect to publicly offered non-UCITS
investment companies are “analogous to a ‘notional amount’ or
commitment approach and generally limit the maximum potential
exposure to 25% of the investment company’s NAV” 307; in addition, the
298. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 32 n.95 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS,
supra note 289, at 6).
299. Id. at 33 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 22).
300. Id. at 33 n.99 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 22).
301. Id. at 33 n.100 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 30–40).
302. Id. at 33 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 23).
303. Id. at n.100 (quoting the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 30–40).
304. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 33 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note
289, at 24). “[T]he relative VaR approach does not measure leverage of the UCITS’ strategies but
instead allows the UCITS to double the risk of loss under a given VaR model.” Id. at n.101 (citing
the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 291, at 24).
305. Id. at 33 (citing the CESR Guidelines for UCITS, supra note 289, at 40).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 35 (citing Central Bank of Ireland, NU SERIES OF NOTICES, Conditions Imposed in
Relation to Collective Investment Schemes Other than UCITS (July 2011) at 13.12, available at
www.centralbank.ie/regulation/industry-sectors/funds/non-ucits/Docuemnts/Non%20UCITS%
20Notices.pdf).
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guidelines impose certain cover requirements. 308 The Canadian
Securities Administrators follow a similar approach. 309
f. Minimizing Credit Risks: The Counterparty Limitation

Some jurisdictions, in addition to imposing limitations such as the
Segregated Account Method and the Global Exposure Method, also
impose limitations restricting the amount of a fund’s exposure to
individual counterparties. 310 For example, Singapore has adopted an
approach similar to the “commitment approach” under the CESR’s
Guidelines for UCITS, in which an investment company’s derivatives
exposure must not exceed 100 percent of its NAV. 311 In addition to this
requirement, an investment company’s exposure to any individual OTC
counterparty cannot exceed 10 percent of its NAV “and is measured on
a maximum potential loss basis that may be incurred by the
investment company if the counterparty defaults.” 312 Under this
system, liquid assets (including cash, AAA-rated government bonds,
and money market instruments) may be utilized as collateral in order
to reduce counterparty exposure. 313 The Hong Kong Securities and
Futures Commission has adopted a similar approach. 314
Mindful of the doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act, and informed
by the nuances of the alternative approaches discussed above, the
following section proposes specific reforms with respect to the Section
18 treatment of derivatives trading by mutual funds.

308. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 35.
309. Id. at 36 (citing National Instrument 81-102 Mutual Funds, at §§ 2.7, 2.8 (Jan. 2011),
available at www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/securitieslaw/policy8/81-102%20Mutual%20Funds
%205BNI%5D% 20Jan-1-11.pdf).
310. See supra note 319, at 31.
311. Id. at 34 (citing The Monetary Authority of Singapore, Code on Collective Investment
Schemes, Chapter 3, § 3.1(f) (April 2011) [hereinafter the Singapore Code], available at
http://www.mas.gov.sg/resource/legislation_guidelines/securities_futures/sub_legislation/1104
08%20Revised%20Code_8%20April_final.pdf).
312. See supra note 319, at 34–35 (citing the Singapore Code, supra note 313, at Appendix 1,
§§ 5.2 and 5.4).
313. See supra note 319, at 34–35 (citing the Singapore Code, supra note 313, at Appendix 1,
§§ 5.7 and 5.8).
314. Id. at 36–37 (discussing Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, Code on Unit
Trusts and Mutual Funds, Chapter 7 (June 2010), available at www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/
intermediaries/ products/handBooks/Eng_UT.pdf).
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4. Suggested Reforms
Legislative and/or regulatory action should be taken, as from a
plain reading of Section 18, any mutual fund trading in derivatives that
“evidence indebtedness” raises senior security issues. 315 Further, the
existing guidance from the SEC and its staff, in light of the current
widespread use of derivatives, is misaligned with the doctrinal
principles of the 1940 Act. 316 This Section outlines reform proposals. 317
First, the ideal resolution would be for Congress to address the
matter, as discussed above in Part V(B)(3)(a), given the high volume of
derivatives trading by mutual funds; the limited information available
regarding such trading; the numerous highly publicized derivative
disasters of late; the doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act; and the
conservative investment goals of the overwhelming majority of
individual mutual fund investors. 318 The issue is too important, and too
immense, to be left to the agency rulemaking process. That being said,
it is unlikely that any such action would happen in the near term, given
the significant political opposition to financial reform efforts. 319
As such, the SEC must take action. As a prefatory matter, the SEC
must continue to gather and thoroughly analyze current industry
information, carefully evaluating the considerations set forth in Section
6(c) of the 1940 Act; 320 the comment letters and information gathered
in response to the SEC Concept Release are obviously geared to that
end. 321 Further, the detailed information required by the CFTC’s Final
CPO Rules with respect to derivatives transactions of funds and CFCs
that meet the “commodity pool” definition 322 will assist the SEC in
understanding the types and magnitudes of current transactions by
mutual funds.
The following paragraphs outline the parameters of the
regulations that the SEC should implement, with details to be filled in
depending on the results of the information-gathering process. The
315. See supra Part V(B).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 243–46.
317. This discussion is informed, in part, by the “Request for Comment” section set forth in the
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 37–48.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 20–22.
319. See supra text accompanying note 252.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 243–46.
321. See Comments on Concept Release: Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, SEC.GOV, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3311/s73311.shtml (last visited July 15, 2012); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at n.7
and 8.
322. See supra Part III(B).
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recommendations below draw from various alternative approaches
detailed above in the preceding section and are built on the doctrinal
foundations of the 1940 Act discussed above in Part IV(B), including
(1) the drafters’ “core purpose” of protecting investors from the
dangers of senior securities, (2) prohibiting funds’ excessive use of
leverage; and (3) ensuring that funds operate with sufficient assets and
reserves.

Senior Security Treatment: Although derivative transactions that
“evidence indebtedness” may be senior securities under a plain
reading of Section 18(f)(1), because of their importance to investors
for various reasons, they should be exempted from prohibition, as long
as the following requirements are met.
Asset Coverage Requirement: Under Section 18, conventional
bank borrowings by mutual funds require 300% asset coverage. As
derivative transactions with indebtedness leverage may be understood
as the functional equivalent of such borrowings, asset coverage
requirements should be imposed. 323 Thus, the 300% asset coverage
requirement of Section 18 with respect to bank borrowings should
apply to derivative transactions that evidence indebtedness as well,
unless the SEC determines, after its detailed analysis, that a different
percentage should be applicable.
Asset Segregation/Cover: The current 100% asset segregation and
cover requirements should continue, with the following qualifications.
Valuation: Until the SEC has sufficient information to adequately
assess various types of transactions, asset segregation and cover
requirements should be calculated with respect to notional amounts
for all derivative transactions evidencing indebtedness, with netting of
such amounts permitted in certain circumstances. The CFTC’s net
notional test referenced in Part III(B) above would be informative in
this regard. Alternative valuation methods are simply inadequate to
protect investors and to ensure adequate coverage of a fund’s potential
obligations consistent with the provisions of Section and the doctrinal
foundations of the 1940 Act at this time. (However, if after sufficient
information regarding derivatives practices has been gathered, it may
be justified at some time to convert to a regulation system that sets
forth in a detailed schedule all derivative types and corresponding
appropriate segregation/ cover requirements.)
Segregated Securities: Securities may be segregated in accord with
the Merrill No-Action Letter; however, such securities should be
323. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 42.
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marked-to-market at least twice daily, with additional amounts
segregated to maintain the 100 percent asset segregation requirement.
Although this approach presents the risk of intraday price decreases in
securities, which may result in insufficient amounts to meet the fund’s
obligations under its derivative transactions, the benefits to investors
of not locking up the fund’s “liquid assets,” as was previously required
under Release 10666, outweighs such risks.
Schedule of Appropriate Offsetting Transactions: The regulations
should set forth a detailed schedule of appropriate offsetting
transactions, which could be effectuated in lieu of segregating assets.
Leaving such matters to the discretion of the investment adviser,
which is the case now, is inconsistent with the doctrinal principles of
the 1940 Act.
Indebtedness Leverage: The restrictions would be applicable only
with respect to instruments that present indebtedness leverage (as is
currently the approach used by the SEC). However, as more
information becomes available, it may be appropriate to include
instruments presenting economic leverage as well. In addition, further
regulation of derivatives transactions through CFCs and other similar
structures must be considered.
Stress-Testing Policies: In addition to the foregoing, funds should
be required to implement “rigorous, comprehensive and risk-adequate
stress testing program[s],” as required by the CESR’s Guidelines for
UCITS under certain circumstances. 324
Counterparty Limitations: Funds should be required to disclose
counterparty percentages in all quarterly and annual reports that
exceed a certain threshold level (with such level to be determined by
the SEC after a thorough review and analysis of available information).
Additionally, if the Section 6(c) analysis warrants, it may be
appropriate to enact single exposure limitations with respect to
counterparties and clearing houses.
Conclusion: The approach outlined above presents a good starting
place for addressing the misalignment between Section 18’s strict
prohibitions against the issuance of senior securities and today’s
widespread use of derivatives evidencing indebtedness by mutual
funds. This approach recognizes the beneficial uses that derivatives
trading can afford mutual fund investors, striking a fair balance
between strictly prohibiting derivative transactions that evidence
indebtedness and constitute senior securities, as a plain reading of
Section 18 would require, and letting funds decide the matter for
324. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 46 (quoting CESR’s Global Guidelines for UCITS,
supra note 289, at 35).
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themselves, as is now, pretty much, the case. As previously stated, the
parameters above should be modified as needed, based upon the
outcome of the SEC’s detailed analysis, in accordance with the
doctrinal principles set forth in Part IV(B) above.
C. REQUIREMENTS REGARDING DIVERSIFICATION

As discussed above in Part IV(C), the 1940 Act requires mutual
funds to specify whether they are “diversified” or “non-diversified” in
their registration statements. Once this designation is made, a
diversified fund cannot change its status without shareholder
approval. The increased use of derivatives by mutual funds has
presented complex issues not foreseen by the drafters of the 1940 Act.
The 1940 Act truly contemplated a different world. Engrained in the
Act, and assumed until not that long ago, is that investment companies
were investing in a market of stocks, bonds and similar securities. It
also approaches many areas such as concentration and diversification,
to name but two, based on the amount of money invested, rather than
the degree of exposure the fund has undertaken. That of course is not
always the case now. With so many derivative instruments available to
enhance an investment strategy, a fund’s manager can design a
portfolio in a multitude of ways to create different exposures that are
unrelated to the amount of money invested and are not necessarily
reflective of the types of instruments the fund holds.
With respect to derivatives transactions, two main issues under
the anachronistic provisions of the 1940 Act arise: (1) valuing such
derivatives and (2) identifying the issuer of each derivative. 325
1. Valuing Derivatives for Purposes of the Diversification Classifications

For purposes of determining the appropriate diversification
classification under the 1940 Act, all fund assets, including derivatives,
must be valued using “market values” or “fair values” as of the end of
the last preceding fiscal quarter, “unless the context otherwise
requires;” if such derivatives were acquired after the fiscal quarter end,
then they should be valued at cost. 326 Section 2(a)(41) requires that,
325. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 51–53.
326. See supra Part V(A)(1); see also, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41) (2006) (defining “value”); SEC
Concept Release, supra note 1, at 50–52.

KIBBIE_EDITED (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2013

DERIVATIVES DEVIL: MUTUAL FUNDS

2/1/2013 12:15 AM

251

with respect to securities and other assets owned at the end of the
preceding fiscal quarter, “unless the context otherwise requires,” (1) if
market quotations are “readily available” for a specific portfolio
security, the value of such security is the market quotation, and (2) for
other securities and assets, the value is the “fair value . . . as
determined in good faith by the board of directors . . . .” 327 Typically,
exchange-traded derivatives are valued using market quotations, and
OTC derivatives are given a “fair value” determination by the board. 328
“Under either measure, the value of a derivative would appear to
be the value at which the derivative could be sold or otherwise
transferred at the relevant time.” 329 However, the problem arises that
such “mark-to-market values at a given point do not reflect the asset
base on which future gains and losses will be based or otherwise
represent the potential future exposure of the fund under the derivatives
investment.” 330 Thus, under the current mark-to-market valuation
standards, a fund could fall below the 5% threshold with respect to
exposure to any single issuer and classify itself as diversified, while
maintaining exposure above the 5% threshold on a notional basis. 331
Although the ABA Task Force Report recommends this mark-to-market
approach, 332 it is misaligned with the doctrinal foundations of the 1940
Act set forth in Part IV(C) above.
To remedy the above-stated problems, the SEC could make a
determination that the valuation procedures set forth in Section
2(a)(41) are inappropriate with respect to determining the value of
derivative positions for diversification calculations and that notional
amounts should instead be used. Additionally, the SEC could require
disclosure of both values, so that investors are adequately informed.
Another approach would be to require subclassifications of the
diversification classification to reflect the notional exposures. 333
Specific proposed reforms are set forth in Section (3) below.
327. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41)(A) (2006) (defining “value”); SEC Concept Release, supra note 1,
at 49–53. The SEC Concept Release notes that, “[a]s a general matter, most derivatives appear to
be notes or evidences of indebtedness and thus securities for purposes of the diversification
requirements.” SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 50–51 n.132; see also supra note 186
(referencing the view of the ABA Task Force Report that futures other than security futures are
not securities).
328. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 52.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See, e.g, id.
332. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, 28.
333. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 54.
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2. Identifying the Issuer of Each Derivative
As previously explained in Part IV(C), in performing the
diversification calculations, each fund must determine whether it has
invested more than 5% of its total assets in any single issuer (with
respect to its 75% bucket). As derivative transactions include
exposure both to a reference asset and to a counterparty, a question
arises as to whether the issuer is the issuer of the reference asset or
the counterparty. 334
The SEC Concept Release states that “[i]n general, the ‘issuer’ of an
OTC derivative entered into by a fund would appear to be the fund’s
counterparty, and the ‘issuer’ of an exchange-traded derivative would
appear to be the clearinghouse due to the novation.” 335 However, the
question remains as to how to account for the exposure to the issuer of
the reference asset.
The ABA Task Force Report recommends disregarding
counterparty exposures for purposes of the diversification
classifications and determining the Section 5(b) calculations only with
respect to the reference asset issuers. 336 However, a more conservative
approach might be to treat the “issuer” as the reference asset issuer,
but require disclosure of a parallel set of calculations treating the
counterparty or clearinghouse, as the case may be, as the issuer. 337
Another approach would be to require sub-classifications of the
diversification classification to reflect both “issuer” concepts. 338
Proposed regulatory reforms are set forth in the next Section.

334. See, e.g, SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 53–54.
335. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 53 (emphasis added) (citing Exemptions for
Security-Based Swaps Issued by Certain Clearing Agencies, Securities Act Release No. 9222, 76
Fed. Reg. 34920 (June 9, 2011), at n. 18). However, it should be noted that, after Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act is fully implemented, many OTC derivatives will be cleared as well.
336. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 27–28; SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 55.
Specifically, the ABA Task Force Report recommends that counterparty exposures should be
addressed under §12(d)(3) of the 1940 Act (which restricts purchases from various securitiesrelated issuers), as further set forth below.
337. Such disclosures should set forth single issuer exposure percentages, as well as a
disclosure of whether the transactions are cleared or uncleared (and if any collateralization
agreements are in place). It should be noted that if an uncleared transaction incorporates an
appropriate collateralization agreement giving the fund first priority access to bankruptcyremote collateral from the counterparty, such transaction might be able to be treated as a cleared
transaction. See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 10.
338. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 54.
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3. Suggested Reforms
The following paragraphs propose regulations that the SEC should
implement as an initial approach to the diversification issues discussed
above, with details to be filled in depending on the results of the SEC’s
information-gathering process. These recommendations incorporate
the doctrinal policies discussed above in Part IV(C), including (1)
preventing a diversified fund from being “too closely tied to the
success of one or a few issuers or controlling portfolio companies,” 339
and (2) ensuring that investors receive clear and accurate disclosure
regarding the nature of the fund’s portfolio.

Valuation: Until complete information regarding derivatives
transactions by mutual funds is gathered and analyzed, the SEC should
declare that the valuation procedures set forth in Section 2(a)(41) are
inappropriate with respect to determining the value of derivative
positions for diversification calculations and that notional amounts
should instead be used. Again, the CFTC’s net notional test referenced
in Part III(B) above would be informative in this regard. Additionally,
the SEC should require disclosure of calculations based on both
valuation methods, so that investors are adequately informed.
Determination of the Issuer: The SEC should adopt rules
designating the “issuer” of a derivative security for purposes of the
diversification requirements as the reference asset issuer. In addition,
the SEC should require disclosure of a parallel set of calculations
treating the counterparty or clearinghouse, as the case may be, as the
issuer (with accompanying disclosure) regarding (i) single issuer
exposure percentages, (ii) designations of the transactions as cleared
or uncleared, and (iii) descriptions of collateralization agreements
specifying bankruptcy-remote, first-priority collateral. If the SEC’s
analysis warrants, it could also establish subclassifications of the
diversification classification to reflect both “issuer” concepts.
Conclusion: The approach outlined above incorporates the
doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act and would ensure that investors
receive more accurate information regarding the diversification of
their investments and the multiple exposures generated by derivative
instruments. As previously indicated, such recommendations should
be modified as needed, based upon the outcome of the SEC’s analysis,
in accordance with the principles set forth in Part IV(C) above.
339. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 49 (citing the 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note
136, at 188 (Statement of David Schenker, SEC Investment Trust Study Chief Counsel, regarding a
draft of § 5(b)(1) similar to the current statute)).
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D. RESTRICTIONS REGARDING EXPOSURE TO SECURITIES-RELATED ISSUERS

As referenced above in Part IV(D), Section 12(d)(3) of the 1940
Act generally prohibits investment companies from (1) purchasing or
otherwise acquiring any security that is issued by an underwriter,
broker, dealer or investment adviser (collectively, “securities related
issuers”) and (2) acquiring any other interest in the business of a
securities related issuer. However, as set forth below, Rule 12d3-1
offers some relief from these prohibitions.
Rule 12d3-1 allows a fund to acquire the securities of (1) “any
person that, in its most recent fiscal year, derived 15 percent or less of
its gross revenues from securities related activities unless . . . [such
fund] would control such person after the acquisition” 340 and (2) “a
person that, in its most recent fiscal year, derived more than 15
percent of its gross assets from securities related activities . . . .” 341
provided that such acquisition (a) of equity securities 342 will not result
in the fund owning “more than [5%] of the outstanding securities of
that class of the issuer’s equity securities;” 343 (b) of debt securities 344
will not result in the fund owning “more than [10%] of the outstanding
principal amount of the issuer’s debt securities;” 345 and (c) will not
result in the fund investing “more than [5%] of the value of its total
assets in the securities of the issuer.” 346 The rule specifies other
prohibitions, including a proscription on the acquisition of general
partnership interests in securities-related issuers and of securities
issued by the principal underwriter, promoter or investment of a fund
(of affiliates of such persons), subject to certain exceptions. 347
As discussed below, issues under Section 12(d)(3) can arise if
(1) the counterparty to a derivative transaction is a securities-related
issuer or (2) the reference asset issuer is a securities-related issuer.
Further, valuation issues similar to those previously discussed may be
340. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(a) (2010).
341. Id.
342. Rule 12d3-1(d)(3) adopts the definition of “equity security” contained in Rule 3a11 of the
Exchange Act, which includes certain derivatives. 17 C.F.R. §240.3a-11; see also, e.g., SEC Concept
Release, supra note 1, at 58 n.151.
343. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(b)(1) (2010).
344. Rule 12d3-1(d)(4) defines “debt securities” as “all securities other than equity securities.”
17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(d)(4) (2010); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 58 n.149.
345. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(b)(2) (2010).
346. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12d3-1(b)(2)
347. Id. § 270.12d3-1(c)(2010); see also, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 58.
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implicated with respect to Section 12(b)(3) calculations. Such issues
are discussed below.
1. Section 12(d)(3) Counterparty Issues

Issues arise under Section 12(d)(3) if the counterparty to an
OTC derivatives transaction is a securities-related issuer; in that event,
“a fund’s acquisition of that obligation may constitute an acquisition of
a security or another interest in a securities-related issuer within the
scope of section 12(d)(3) of the . . . [1940 Act]. 348 In a 2001 release, the
SEC acknowledged that, with respect to a repurchase agreement with a
securities-related issuer, an investment company may be acquiring a
However, if the
prohibited interest in such counterparty. 349
counterparty is a security-related issuer, Rule 12d3-1 may allow the
transaction, if the derivative at issue is a “security issued by that
counterparty.”
Rule 12d3-1 would not provide relief from the Section 12(d)(3)
prohibition if the derivative is not a “security issued by the
counterparty,” but rather “an interest in a securities related issuer”
because the rule applies only to “securities.” 350 In that event, the
transaction would be prohibited under Section 12(d)(3).
Because of the dearth of information regarding mutual fund
derivatives trading activity, the most prudent approach would be for
the SEC to gather the required information, in connection with the CPO
reporting requirements of the CFTC, and make a determination then of
whether further action is required with respect to derivatives that are
not “securities,” but “interests” in a securities-related issuer.

348. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 59. With respect to exchange-traded derivatives,
the clearing house is usually considered the issuer of the derivative. See, e.g., id. In a 1984 noaction letter, the Staff adopted the reasoning that a fund acquiring exchange-traded options
would not be acquiring securities issued by a securities-related issuer. Id. (citing Institutional
Equity Fund, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1984)).
349. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 59 (emphasis added) (citing Treatment of
Repurchase Agreements and Refunded Securities as an Acquisition of the Underlying Securities,
Investment Company Act Release No. 25058, 66 Fed. Reg. 36156 (July 5, 2001), at n. 5 and
accompanying text).
350. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 59–60 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., ABA Task
Force Report, supra note 14, at 32.
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2. Section 12(d)(3) Reference Asset Issues
In addition to the counterparty issues discussed above, “[i]f the
derivative transaction is based upon the price or value of securities
issued by, or interests in, a securities-related issuer, the fund’s
relationship to the issuer of the reference asset may raise both of the
concerns underlying section 12(d)(3)—the fund’s exposure to the risks
of the securities-related issuer and the potential for reciprocal
practices.” 351 For example, if the reference asset issuer is a brokerdealer, the fund could direct brokerage to such broker-dealer to
enhance the value of such reference asset, thus increasing its own
position; such actions by the fund would violate Section 12(d)(3), and
the fund would have to consider whether a Rule 12d3-1 exemption
was available. 352
As set forth below in Subsection (4), the SEC should engage in
rulemaking to clarify that, if a fund enters into a derivative transaction
in which the reference asset issuer is a securities-related issuer, such
derivative transaction is prohibited by Section 12(d)(3), as it
constitutes an “interest” in the securities related issuer.

3. Section 12(d)(3) Valuation Issues

As discussed in connection with diversification calculations above
in Part V(C), the calculations required by Rule 12d3-1 may be
understated where derivative valuations are based on market value or
fair value. Although some funds use notional amounts for these
calculations, “the practice is not uniform.” 353 In fact, the ABA Task
Force Report notes that “the exemption in Rule 12d3-1 appear[s] to
apply to the market values of the instruments . . . .” 354 As the SEC has
not spoken on this issue, 355 guidance is necessary.
The following Subsection sets forth suggested regulatory reforms.

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 60–61.
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 61.
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 62.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 33.
Id.
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4. Suggested Reforms
This Subsection proposes regulations that the SEC should enact as
an initial approach to the Section 12(d)(3) issues discussed above, with
details to be filled in depending on the results of the SEC’s informationgathering process. The recommendations below incorporate the
doctrinal policies discussed above in Part IV(D), including (1) limiting
“a fund’s exposure to the entrepreneurial risks of securities-related
issuers,” 356 (2) prohibiting fund sponsors from taking advantage of
their sponsored funds, 357 and (3) limiting “abusive reciprocal practices
between funds and securities-related issuers.” 358

Counterparty Issues: If a derivative is a “security” for purposes of
Section 12(d)(3), which the SEC Concept Release notes is typically the
case, then Rule 12d3-1 adequately addresses the doctrinal principles
discussed in Part IV(D) above. However, if a derivative instrument is
deemed to be an “interest” in a securities-related issuer, which the SEC
Concept Release implies happens rarely, then Rule 12d3-1 would not
apply, and the transaction would be prohibited under Section 12(d)(3).
Because most derivatives are “securities” for purposes of these
provisions, the SEC does not need to take any action with respect to
counterparty issues at this time. Of course, this position should be
modified should additional information warrant.
Reference Asset Issues: The SEC should enact regulations to
clarify that, if a fund enters into a derivative transaction in which the
reference asset issuer is a securities-related issuer, such derivative
transaction is prohibited by Section 12(d)(3), as it constitutes an
“interest” in the securities related issuer. The regulations should
clearly define, and provide examples of, derivatives that constitute
“interests” in the reference asset issuer. This approach is in accord
with the foundational principles discussed above in Part IV(D).
Specifically, exposure to a reference asset through a derivative
transaction makes the fund vulnerable to the “entrepreneurial risks” of
the reference asset issuer and creates a landscape ripe for abusive
reciprocal practices. 359
Valuation: For reasons previously stated, as a starting point,
notional amounts should be used for all Rule 12d-3 calculations. Again,
the CFTC’s net notional test referenced in Part III(B) above would be
356.
357.
358.
359.

SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 57.
Id. at 57–58.
SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 58.
See supra Part IV(D).
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informative in this regard. However, the SEC should require disclosure
of calculations based on both valuation methods, so that investors are
adequately informed.
Conclusion: The approach outlined above incorporates the
doctrinal foundations set forth in Part IV(D) in light of today’s market
realities and would serve to protect investors from potential abuses by
fund sponsors, as well as abusive reciprocal practices. As previously
discussed, such recommendations should be modified as needed,
based upon the outcome of the SEC’s Section 6(c) analysis.
E. RESTRICTIONS REGARDING PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION
1. Overview

As set forth above, Section 8(b)(1)(E) of the 1940 Act requires
investment companies to disclose their policies regarding
“concentrating investments in a particular industry or group of
industries” in their registration statements. 360 Oddly, neither the 1940
Act nor the rules promulgated thereunder contain definitions of
“concentration” or “industry or groups of industries.” 361 However, the
SEC has addressed the concentration threshold issue, stating that “a
fund is concentrated in a particular industry or group of industries if
the fund invests or proposes to invest more than 25% of the value of
its net assets in a particular industry or group of industries.” 362 The
SEC has given funds the discretion to determine industry
concentrations, as long as they are “reasonable” and narrow enough
“that the primary economic characteristics of the companies in a single
class are materially different.” 363
By entering into one derivative transaction, a fund may gain
exposure to numerous industries or groups of industries, giving rise to
issues under the concentration provision of the 1940 Act. 364 The SEC
Concept Release gives the example that by entering into a total return
swap on a pharmaceutical stock with a bank, an investment company
would gain exposure to the pharmaceutical industry, as well as the
360. See supra Part IV(E).
361. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 65; see also, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note
14, at 29.
362. Id.
363. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 65.
364. Id.
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banking industry. 365 The SEC has not provided guidance as to how the
25 percent concentration limit should be addressed with derivative
instruments that provide multiple exposures.
The ABA Task Force Report states that “funds typically comply
with their concentration policies by looking to the reference asset and
not any counterparty to the derivative instrument . . . [and that] [f]unds
typically use market values for these calculations . . . .” 366 A more
conservative approach to the one recommended by the ABA Task
Force Report would be to require the use of notional amounts in the 25
percent threshold calculation, and to require industry concentration
calculation based on the reference asset issuer, but to require
disclosure of a parallel set of calculations treating the counterparty or
clearinghouse, as the case may be, as the issuer. 367 Another approach
would be to require subclassifications of the diversification
classification to reflect both “issuer” concepts. 368
The following Section sets forth suggested regulatory reforms.
2. Suggested Reforms

Following is an outline of proposed regulations to remedy the
issues with respect to the 1940 Act concentration provisions detailed
above. As with other proposed reform discussions, modifications to
the following should be made as the SEC’s information gathering
process warrants. The regulations proposed below incorporate the
doctrinal policies of full and fair disclosure to investors regarding the
nature of portfolio concentrations and corresponding implied risk
levels discussed in Part IV(E).
Industries and Industry Groups: The SEC should create a clear
schedule of industries and industry groups applicable to all funds with
respect to concentration classifications, rather than leaving these
definitions up to the funds to create.

365. SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 65–66.
366. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 29; see, e.g., SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at
66.
367. Such disclosures should set forth single issuer exposure percentages, as well as a
disclosure of whether the transactions are cleared or uncleared (and if any collateralization
agreements are in place). It should be noted that if an uncleared transaction incorporates an
appropriate collateralization agreement giving the fund first priority access to bankruptcyremote collateral from the counterparty, such transaction might be able to be treated as a cleared
transaction. See, e.g., ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 10.
368. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 1, at 54.
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Concentration Calculations: The SEC should enact regulations
requiring industry concentration calculations to be based on exposure
to the reference asset issuer; however, the SEC should also require
funds to disclose a parallel set of calculations treating the counterparty
or clearinghouse, as the case may be, as the issuer.
Valuation: For reasons previously stated, as a starting point,
notional amounts should be used for all concentration calculations.
Again, the CFTC’s net notional test referenced in Part III(B) above
would be informative in this regard. However, the SEC should require
disclosure of calculations based on both valuation methods detailed
above, so that investors are adequately informed.
Conclusion: The foregoing recommendations are based on the
doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act seeking to ensure that investors
receive complete and truthful information regarding the nature of the
portfolio holdings of their mutual funds, as well as corresponding risk
levels. As indicated above, such proposals should be modified as
needed, based upon the outcome of the SEC’s information gathering
process, in accordance with the doctrinal principles set forth in Part
IV(E) above.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is astounding that there is no reliable information regarding the
general use of derivatives by registered investment companies.
Congress has not revisited the 1940 Act to address the complicated
issues addressed herein. Further, the SEC has not provided formal
guidance regarding the matter since 1979, years before swaps were
even invented. Given the numerous examples of derivatives disasters
highlighting the catastrophic possibilities of these complex contracts,
juxtaposed with the clearly annunciated purposes of the 1940 Act to
protect investors from the dangers of leverage, reform is needed.
The doctrinal foundations of the 1940 Act, built from lessons
learned during the endemic financial abuses of the 1930s, are being
undermined by mutual funds’ pervasive use of complex derivative
instruments. The current statutory and regulatory framework is
inadequate to deal with this complicated issue; reforms must be made
to prevent the types of harms to investors and the financial markets
that the 1940 Act was designed to prevent, while preserving the
unique benefits that derivatives trading can offer. Congress and the
SEC must decisively turn the lights on the mutual fund industry’s dance
with the derivatives devil and ensure that what is now a dangerous
liaison evolves into a risk-appropriate rapprochement.

